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“When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by analysis, that
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that study (i) collusion in forward markets,
(ii) investor behavior in response to ecological disasters, and (iii) the willingness to
accept - willingness to pay disparity in the presence of uncertainty.
Chapter 1 reports the results of a laboratory experiment that examines the strate-
gic effect of forward contracts on market power in infinitely repeated duopolies. Two
competing effects motivate the experimental design. Allaz and Vila (1993) argue
that forward markets act like additional competitors in that they increase quantity
competition among firms. Conversely, Liski and Montero (2006) argue that forward
contracting can facilitate collusive outcomes by enabling firms to soften competition.
The experiment provides a first simultaneous test of these rival effects. Contrary to
previous experimental studies, the results do not support the quantity-competition
effect. Further, the findings provide evidence in support of the collusive hypothesis.
Chapter 2 analyzes investor behavior in response to ecological disasters. Specif-
ically, I test for the presence of “green” preferences in stock markets using variation
in abnormal returns of publicly traded companies that differ in their environmental
footprint. I employ Newsweek’s detailed green rankings of the 500 largest U.S. firms
as an identification strategy and I find that cumulative abnormal returns following an
ecological disaster significantly differ based on companies’ environmental performance
scores.
Chapter 3 reports the results of a laboratory experiment that tests the robustness
of the willingness to accept - willingness to pay disparity for private good and public
good lotteries in the presence of uncertainty. Using an incentive compatible elicitation
mechanism, the experiment explores the existence of the disparity and its interdepen-
iv
dence with uncertainty and the income effect. The findings suggest that the disparity
persists for both private and public goods for monetary lotteries. While there is sig-
nificant evidence for social preferences in the public good setting, the disparity is even
stronger than in the private good setting.
v
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Chapter 1




Antitrust authorities and researchers have a profound interest in identifying and un-
derstanding the factors that determine the likelihood of collusion. There is extensive
theoretical and empirical work that focuses on the determinants of firms’ coordi-
nated efforts to achieve profits in excess of the competitive outcome. Most empirical
evidence comes from experiments as relevant field data is difficult to obtain and iden-
tification of specific factors can be challenging due to interactions and unobservables.
Controlled laboratory experiments, however, allow targeted tests in market environ-
ments that satisfy the assumptions of the underlying model of interest. This article
studies the effect of forward contracting on tacit collusion in laboratory Cournot
1
duopolies.
Historically, forward contracts have played an important role in commodity mar-
kets and more recently in financial asset markets. They have also become increasingly
important in electricity wholesale markets. Forward contracting is a prevalent instru-
ment in hedging risk: Forward contracts allow buyers and sellers to potentially offset
unfavorable price movements in the spot market by shifting risk to less risk-averse
market participants1.
Theoretical work, however, suggests that even in the absence of risk and uncer-
tainty, forward markets create strategic incentives for firms. There are two competing
strands in the theoretical literature on the strategic effects of forward markets in a
setting where firms compete over quantity. One strand argues that a forward mar-
ket acts like additional competitors in that it increases quantity competition among
firms (Allaz, 1992; Allaz and Vila, 1993; Bushnell, 2007). The underlying intuition
is that quantity-setting firms will sell some of their production forward to improve
their position relative to competitors in the spot market. In the spot market, firms
will then compete over the residual demand. The forward market therefore creates
a prisoner’s dilemma where each firm has an incentive to sell forward to improve its
position relative to its competitor(s) in the spot market (Stackelberg leader advan-
tage). Nonetheless, firms would be better off jointly by not trading forward. As a
result, each firm produces more than in the absence of forward markets, total output
increases, market price decreases and therefore market efficiency increases. Following
the Western U.S. energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, this pro-competitive prediction led
to suggestions to remove restrictions on forward contracts with the goal of limiting
1See Wolak (2000); Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) for a discussion of forward contracts as
optimal hedging instruments in wholesale electricity markets.
2
the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power (Joskow, 2001).
The other strand of theoretical work challenges this market efficiency enhancing
prediction. The pro-competitive hypothesis results from a finite horizon assump-
tion. In an infinitely repeated setting, however, the existence of forward markets can
increase the likelihood of collusive outcomes. According to the Folk (Friedman) the-
orem, the collusive outcome is one of many equilbria in an infinitely repeated setting.
Liski and Montero (2006) argue that, in infinitely repeated oligopolies, forward mar-
kets give firms the ability to maintain the tacitly collusive outcome more so than in
the absence of forward markets. In particular, the range of discount factors that sup-
port the collusive equilibrium is wider when firms repeatedly interact both in forward
and spot markets. Two effects drive this result. First, the gains from deviating from
the collusive path are never greater than the gains in an infinitely repeated oligopoly
without forward markets. However, importantly, the greater a firm’s forward po-
sition, the lower its incentive to defect in the spot market. Second, the subgame
perfect sanctioning strategy (Allaz and Vila equilibrium) is more costly than in the
absence of forward markets (standard Cournot equilibrium). Other theoretical work
also suggests that forward markets yield strategic motives that do not mitigate firms’
market power (Ferreira, 2003; Mahenc and Meunier, 2003; Mahenc and Salanié, 2004;
Murphy and Smeers, 2010).
One motivating example in the literature are restructured wholesale electricity
markets. Most wholesale electricity markets are characterized by a few firms produc-
ing a homogeneous good that cannot be stored economically at the large scale; and
these firms repeatedly interact in both forward and spot markets. However, empirical
work on the effects of forward contracts in wholesale electricity markets is limited and
the findings are mixed (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002; Shawky et al., 2003).
3
The focus of this article is to investigate whether forward sales yield strategic
effects in a setting where the same firms repeatedly interact in Cournot oligopolies.
In particular, I test the collusive hypothesis of Liski and Montero against the pro-
competitive hypothesis of Allaz and Vila in a controlled laboratory experiment. Pre-
vious experimental studies on the strategic effect of forward markets report results
that support the pro-competitive prediction (Le Coq and Orzen, 2006; Van Koten
and Ortmann, 2011; Brandts et al., 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010). These studies do
not find evidence of collusive outcomes. However, the experimental designs in these
studies do not support the collusive prediction2. In this article, I report the results of
an experimental design that supports both collusive and pro-competitive hypotheses
in indefinitely repeated duopolies3. The design differs from previous studies in that
it strictly imposes forward-spot price parity to eliminate any price uncertainty effects
and to allow for multiple collusive strategies that involve forward trading. Forward-
spot price parity implies that the forward price is equal to the spot price. Further, the
design restricts subjects’ quantity choices to a discrete choice set, which reflects dif-
ferent pure strategies in the Cournot stage-game and allows me to constrast strategy
choices by treatment.
I compare the market outcomes of a two-phase duopoly with forward trading to
the results of a standard, single-phase duopoly. Specifically, I examine differences in
collusive outcomes between these two treatments. I investigate stage-game outcomes
in the spot market phase conditional on forward phase outcomes to test for differences
in strategic play between colluding and non-colluding firms. To compare the compet-
2The designs use a forward market pricing rule that (1) eliminates collusive strategies that involve
forward sales; and that (2) introduces price uncertainty between forward and spot market.
3Note that repeated play of the Allaz and Vila stage-game strategy is one of many subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies in an infinitely repeated setting.
4
itive effect of market entry to the effect of forward markets, I report the differences
in market efficiency between a three-firm oligopoly and the two-phase duopoly.
The main result of the experiment is that, contrary to previous experimental find-
ings, introducing a forward market in a duopoly may not increase market efficiency.
The findings in the standard duopoly treatment are not different from the findings of
Le Coq and Orzen (2006). Nevertheless, market efficiency is signficantly lower in the
forward-phase duopoly treatment. The pro-competitive hypothesis predicts that the
effect of a forward market is equivalent to squaring the number of firms. However,
I find that one additional competitor significantly limits market power in a duopoly
whereas a forward market does not. Further, I provide evidence that allowing firms
to trade forward can facilitate collusive outcomes.
The organization of the remainder of the article is as follows. Section 1.2 presents
the predictions of the pro-competitive and collusive theories and derives the hypothe-
ses which guide the experimental design. Section 1.3 describes the experimental
design and procedures. Section 1.4 presents the results of the article, and Section 1.5
discusses the main findings.
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
First, I derive the pro-competitive predictions of the stage-game and then contrast
them to the collusive predictions of the infinitely repeated game. Notice that, ac-
cording to the Folk theorem, repeated play of the stage-game equilibrium strategy
is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the indefinitely repeated game. In the
following derivation, I only consider a single forward market opening prior to the spot
market (for a detailed derivation with multiple forward market openings, see Allaz
5
and Vila, 1993; Ferreira, 2003).
1.2.1 Competitive Framework
1.2.1.1 Standard Cournot Game
First, consider a single phase Cournot game with J firms that compete over quantity.
Without loss of generality, assume symmetric firms with zero production cost. For
simplicity, let the inverse demand function be given by












; ∀j; pc = α
J + 1
, (1.2.2)
where πj denotes firm j’s profits. Backward induction implies that the one-shot game
predictions hold in a finitely repeated game.
1.2.1.2 Two-Phase Cournot Game
Now consider a two-phase Cournot game in which a forward market is followed by
a standard Cournot game spot market. The good is physically bought and sold in
the spot market. In the first phase (forward market), firms can sell some or all of
their production for delivery in the second phase (spot market). At the end of the
first phase, firms observe the forward market outcome. In the second phase, firms
compete in quantity over the residual demand. At the end of the second phase, firms
observe the spot market production and total production of their competitor(s), the
6
market price, p, and profit πj
4.
The existence of arbitrage traders in the market will yield forward-spot price
parity, pf = ps = p (q) (where pf (ps) denote the forward-phase (spot-phase) price,
respectively). Arbitrage traders will compete in prices over firms’ short forward posi-
tions and will try to sell them at a profit to buyers in the spot market. In equilibrium,
any price differences between the two phases will disappear. Another way to think
about forward-spot price parity is that buyers have perfect foresight and are therefore
indifferent between buying in the forward or spot market.
The game can be solved using backward induction. Let f (s) denote total units
sold in the first (second) phase, respectively. The model assumes that firms treat their
first-phase profits as being unaffected by their second-phase production decisions.
Given forward positions, firm j’s profit maximization problem in the spot market
game can be written as
max
sj
p (sj, s¬j, f) sj for j = 1, . . . , J, (1.2.3)
with corresponding first order condition
0 = p (·) + ∂p (·)
∂sj
sj ∀j. (1.2.4)
With an inverse demand function as given in equation 1.2.1, the first order condition
is
0 = α− f −
J∑
k=1
sk − sj ∀j. (1.2.5)
Simultaneously solving the J best response functions gives firm j’s optimal second








which is a best response to any arbitrary level of forward sales commitment. To obtain
the first phase equilibrium, the second phase best response functions are nested in













(fj + sj (f)) ∀j, (1.2.7)
with corresponding first order condition




















(α− f)− fj. (1.2.9)
























Note that the Cournot equilibrium output of a J-firm, two-phase oligopoly equals
the output of a J2-firm, single-phase oligopoly: qfs (J) = qc (J2). To summarize, in
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a finitely repeated setting, the existence of a single forward market increases quan-
tity competition between firms which increases market efficiency. The following two
hypotheses characterize the predictions of the finitely repeated two-phase game:
Hypothesis 1.1. Oligopoly markets with a forward market phase yield higher output
(lower prices) on average than oligopoly markets with only a spot market phase.
Hypothesis 1.2. The market outcome (total output, price, and profit) of a J-firm,
two-phase oligopoly is equivalent to the market outcome of a J2-firm, single phase
oligopoly.
1.2.2 Tacit Collusion
Next, consider an infinitely repeated Cournot game where the same firms compete
repeatedly with each other. In general, players can maintain cooperative subgame
perfect equilibria if they are concerned about future profits and possible future pun-
ishments. Friedman (1971) shows that for sufficiently high discount rates δ, all firms
jointly producing the monopoly quantity is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
Assume that firms can perfectly observe market outcomes and other firms’ actions.
I assume that when firms play the cooperative subgame strategy, they split the

















In deriving the cooperative, subgame perfect equilibrium predictions, I assume
that firms will play the cooperative subgame strategy until a firm deviates. Once
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one firm deviates from the cooperative path, firms will play the stage-game Nash
equilibrium strategy thereafter5.
1.2.2.1 Standard Cournot Game
In the single phase Cournot game, firm j’s one-period incentive to deviate from the




























πtcj , δ ∈ [0, 1] . (1.2.16)
The implied critical discount factor for the existence of the subgame perfect equilib-
rium can be calculated as
(J2 − 1)2
(J + 1)4 − 16J2
< δ (J) . (1.2.17)
5This is one of many cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.
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1.2.2.2 Two-Phase Cournot Game
In the following derivation, I extend Liski and Montero’s framework to an oligopolistic
setting with J firms. For simplicity, I restrict firms’ positions in the forward market
to short positions only (see Liski and Montero (2006) for details on firms’ holding long
positions in the forward market). In the two-phase Cournot game, several collusive
strategies support the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the cooperative subgame, the
following strategy supports the collusive subgame outcome: firm j sells f tcj = λj · qtcj ,
λj ∈ [0, 1] units in the forward market (first phase) and stcj = (1− λj) · qtcj units in
the spot market (second phase). Notice that firms’ forward positions do not have
to be symmetric (λi 6= λj) in order for the collusive subgame perfect equilibrium to
exist. This is an extension of Liski and Montero’s model. Firms’ production decisions
in the spot market do not affect their forward market profits. This implies that if
a firm has a short forward position, its incentives to deviate from the collusive path
are smaller in the spot-phase stage-game. As a result, the gains of deviating from
the collusive path will never be greater than the profit from deviating in the single
phase stage-game. Further, deviation is more costly in the two-phase game as the
sanctioning path is the two-phase stage-game Cournot equilibrium strategy. These
two effects result in a strictly lower critical discount factor that supports the collusive













6Liski and Montero (2006) show that it is never profitable to deviate in the forward market.
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where λjα/2J = λjq
tc
j denotes firm j’s forward sales expressed in terms of the collusive





(J + 1− λj)
4J






(J + 1− λj)
4J
α. (1.2.19)
Note that the one period profit from cheating in the two-phase game is always less















The left-hand side in equation 1.2.20 is strictly less than the left-hand side in equation
1.2.16. The critical discount factor is therefore strictly lower than the critical discount
factor in the single phase game:
[




(J + 1)2 − λ2j
)
(J2 + 1)2 − 16J3
< δ̃ (λj, J) < δ (J) , ∀λj ∈ [0, 1] . (1.2.21)
Note that δ̃ (λj, J) is decreasing in λj. Table 1.1 summarizes the subgame equilibria
predictions.
The following main hypotheses guide the experimental design. These hypothe-
ses reflect the cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium predictions in the infinitely
repeated, two-phase Cournot game.
Hypothesis 1.3. In an indefinitely repeated setting, two-phase oligopoly markets
yield lower output (higher prices) on average than single phase oligopolies.
Hypothesis 1.4. Firms can sustain the cooperative subgame equilibrium across both
12
phases (forward and spot market) in indefinitely-repeated oligopolies.
Hypothesis 1.5. In indefinitely repeated two-phase oligopolies, firms that sell for-
ward are less likely to defect than firms that have no forward sales position.
Table 1.1: Theoretical Market Outcome Predictions
f s q p πj






























Note: In the single phase stage-game: λ = 0. In the two-phase stage-game: λ ∈ [0, 1].
1.3 Experimental Design
The objective of the experimental design is to test the strategic effect of forward sales
in an infinitely repeated setting. In order to test for the existence of cooperative
subgame equilibria, it is important to create a market environment in the laboratory
that gives the predicted collusive equilibria the best chance of occurrence. The follow-
ing main findings from previous oligopoly experiments contributed to my design (see
Engel, 2007 for a comprehensive meta-analysis of oligopoly experiments). First, the
larger the number of firms, the smaller the observed degree of collusion (see also Huck
et al., 2004). Second, experienced subjects tend to collude more than inexperienced
subjects, i.e. learning plays an important role (Huck et al., 1999). Third, the better
subjects are informed, the more likely they play a cooperative strategy. Lastly, if
subjects play against human buyers, “collusion rates plummet” (Engel, 2007).
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My experiment compares a standard duopoly (C2 treatment) to a two-phase
duopoly with a single forward and a single spot market phase (FS2 treatment). A
third, standard three-firm oligopoly treatment (C3 treatment) allows us to analyze
differences between the effect of adding one additional competitor to the effect of a
single forward market. Adding one additional competitor serves as a lower bound on
the effect of increased competiton from additional firms.
1.3.1 Strategy Design
The main design challenge is to implement forward-spot price parity. The underly-
ing theoretical models assume that demand has perfect foresight. However, in the
laboratory, it is impossible to perfectly predict the decisions that subjects make in a
stage-game. Previous experimental studies that test the pro-competitive prediction
(Le Coq and Orzen, 2006; Ferreira et al., 2010; Van Koten and Ortmann, 2011) use a
pricing rule which dictates the forward price to equal the spot price if and only if all
firms play the pro-competitive strategy. This pricing rule introduces price uncertainty
and it eliminates all cooperative subgame perfect strategies in the forward market as
the calculated forward price is always less than the collusive price. Brandts et al., 2008
let human buyers compete over firms’ forward market positions in a Bertrand game;
however, this does not give the collusive hypothesis a fair chance as it significantly
reduces the likelihood of collusive outcomes (Engel, 2007).
My design automates demand using a computer program. I implement forward-
spot price parity by restricting subjects’ quantity choices to a discrete choice set. The
market price is not determined until after the end of the spot phase. This implies that
subjects do not observe their forward profits before making their spot phase decisions7.
7Subjects only observe the forward quantity commitments.
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Instead, the quantity choices in the spot phase of the stage-game are calculated as
if the spot phase choices do not affect the profits in the forward market. The set
of limited strategies also decreases unintended effects of inexperienced subjects and
increases the likelihood of collusive outcomes (Holt, 1995).
In the forward phase of the FS2 treatment, subjects have the following two choices:
either selling zero units or selling the stage-game equilibrium forward quantity as
predicted by the pro-competitive theory. Notice that the forward quantity is less
than the collusive amount, which admits a collusive strategy across forward and spot
phases. In the spot market (C2 and FS2 treatments), the possible choices are zero,
collusive, Cournot, defecting, and punishing output, which reflect pure strategies. In
the FS2 treatment, the quantity choices are calculated based on the residual demand
(total demand less forward sales).
I provide subjects with a detailed payoff table that lists all possible outcomes.
Subjects are knowledgable of their own and their competitors’ profit in any feasible
stage-game outcome. (A copy of the instructions can be found in Appendix A.3.)
Further, in all treatments, subjects can perfectly monitor the choices made by their
competitor(s).
1.3.2 Demand Specification
The demand side is automated and subjects have zero production costs (γ = 0). The
inverse demand is given by
pm,t = max {120− qm,t, 0} (1.3.1)
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where qm,t denotes the total units sold in market m in round t. As stated above, I
strictly impose forward-spot price parity in the FS2 treatment: psm,t = p
f
m,t = pm,t =
120−fm,t−sm,t, where fm,t and sm,t respectively denote total units sold in the forward
and spot phase. This assures that the conditions of the game in the experiment are
as close to theory as possible without affecting the testable hypotheses. Importantly,
subjects receive the same price for any units sold in either forward or spot phase. In
each round, a subject’s total profit is calculated as the product of their individual
total production times the market price.
Table 1.2 lists the different strategy choices by treatment. In both duopoly treat-
ments, there are five output choices in the spot phase stage-game. In the C3 treat-
ment however, the defecting and punishing output quantities are equivalent, qj = 40.
Therefore, subjects could only choose from a set of four different quantities in the C3
treatment. In the FS2 treatment, subjects can play the collusive strategy in two dif-
ferent ways: either selling zero units forward and 30 units in the spot phase or selling
24 units forward and 6 units in the spot phase, respectively. This yields four different
collusive subgame perfect equilibria in the FS2 treatment. Table 1.3 contrasts the
collusive, Cournot, and defecting outcome predictions for all three treatments. No-
tice that selling forward makes the defecting strategy less tempting in the spot phase
of the stage-game in the FS2 treatment.
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Table 1.2: Sales Choices by Phase, by Treatment
fj sj
C2 - {0, 30, 40, 45, 60}
FS2 {0, 24} {0, (30− fj) , (120− f) /3, (90− fj) /2, (120− f) /2}
C3 - {0, 20, 30, 40}
Table 1.3: Collusive, Cournot, and Defecting Outcome Predictions by Treatment





e C2 - 30 30 - 60 60 60 1,800 75%
FS2 {0, 24} {30, 6} 30 {0, 24, 48} {60, 36, 12} 60 60 1,800 75%




ot C2 - 40 40 - 80 80 40 1,600 89%
FS2 24 24 48 48 48 96 24 1,152 96%




t C2 - 45 45 - 75 75 45 2,025 86%
FS2 0 45 45 {0, 24} {75, 51} 75 45 2,025 86%
FS2 24 33 57 {24, 48} {63, 39} 87 33 1,881 92%
C3 - 40 40 - 80 80 40 1,600 89%
Note: The defectiving outcomes are calculated based on the assumption that the other firm(s) play
the collusive strategy.
The implied critical discount factors in the experiment are δ = 9/17 in the C2
treatment, δ (λj = 0.8) = 1/9, δ (λj = 0) = 25/97 in the FS2 treatment, and δ =
4/7 in the C3 treatment. The punishing strategy in the stage-game allows subjects
to play a more severe grim strategy than just the Nash-reverting strategy. This
implies lower critical discount factors of δ = 1/9 in the C2 treatment, δ (λj = 0.8) =
17
9/209, δ (λj = 0) = 1/9 in the FS2 treatment, and δ = 1/4 in the C3 treatment.
1.3.3 Termination Rule
My design implements a repeated game with uncertain end, which, according to the
Friedman theorem, allows for several subgame equilibria to exist (Friedman, 1971).
Subjects interact with the same matched subject(s) for many rounds (fixed matching),
but they do not know the exact number of rounds until the end of the experimental
session. Normann and Wallace (2012) show that the termination rule in prisoner
dilemma games does not significantly affect cooperation but may influence how sub-
jects can maintain cooperation over time and its influence on end-of-game effects
(see also Selten and Stoecker (1986)). Further, the authors find that the number of
rounds significantly increases cooperation rates. The two-phase duopoly game is a
complicated market mechanism; therefore, I refrain from using a stochastic termina-
tion rule with continuation probability to avoid unnecessary confusion of subjects’
comprehension of the mechanism. Initially, I considered two different termination
rules: known-end (subjects learn the exact number of rounds at the beginning of the
session) and unknown-end. Specifically, I employed the known-end termination rule
in one C2 and one C3 session. In comparing outcomes, I find no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the unknown-end and known-end C3 sessions. In testing for
end-of-game effects, I find that, on average, subjects chose higher outputs (more com-
petitive strategies) in the final round of the known-end C2 session compared to the
average output in 10 rounds prior. Therefore, I exclude the final round observations
in the known-end C2 session from the analysis. Appendix A.1 shows the statistical
analysis of the termination rules and end-of-game effects in detail.
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1.3.4 Procedures
The data was collected in seven experimental sessions at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville in the Spring and Summer semesters of 2012. A total of 144 undergraduate
student subjects participated in the sessions. Each subject participated in one session
only. Each session consisted of at least 25 rounds8 and lasted between one hour and
one hour 30 minutes (the FS2 sessions lasted longer than the Cournot sessions due to
the two-phase format). Subjects earned $23 on average.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously matched
with one (two) other subject(s). Subjects were informed that they will interact with
the same other subject(s) for several rounds. A monitor read the experimental instruc-
tions and explained the computer program to participants. The monitor thoroughly
described the payoff table that accompanied the instructions. To verify that subjects
understood how their earnings were calculated, the computer program asked each
subject four practice questions before the start of the experiment. The computer
program also displayed a payoff table in each decision round that listed all feasible
sales combinations along with payoffs. In the second phase of the FS2 treatment, the
computer program updated this payoff table conditional on the sales decisions in the
first phase.
In each round, each participant had to choose an output amount from a list on the
computer screen. After all participants submitted their sales decisions, the computer
program determined the total units sold and price in each market. (At the end
of the first phase in the FS2 treatment, subjects only observed the forward sales
of their competitor and total forward sales in their market.) At the end of each
round, each subject learned the total output of the other subject(s) in their market,
8The two known-end termination rule sessions consisted of 25 rounds each.
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the total market output, the resulting market price, and their profit for that round.
The computer program summarized and updated the market outcomes from previous
rounds in the form of a table that was displayed on the computer screen at the time
subjects submitted their decisions. (Appendix A.4 shows screen shots of the FS2
treatment.) All treatments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
1.4 Experimental Results
1.4.1 Market Efficiency
First, I analyze the results in terms of total output and market efficiency. Figure
1.1 plots the average total output in each round by treatment along with 95% con-
fidence bands. Horizontal lines at 60, 80, 90, and 96 denote respectively the collu-
sive, standard duopoly stage-game equilibrium, three-firm stage-game equilibrium,
and two-phase duopoly stage-game equilibrium output. The figure shows that the
average two-phase duopoly output (black circles) is not different from the average
standard duopoly output (light gray diamonds). Further, the average total output
in the two-phase duopoly is far less than the predicted two-phase stage-game equi-
librium quantity of 96 units. In both duopoly treatments, the average total output
fluctuates at or below the standard stage-game equilibrium amount of 80 units. The
aggregate three-firm output (gray triangles) oscillates around the stage-game equilib-
rium amount of 90 units. The graph also indicates that total output in both duopoly
treatments is less than in the three-firm treatment. Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 in
Appendix A.2 show the total output by individual markets. These graphs indicate
that outcomes are heterogeneous across markets. Some markets maintain either the
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Note: Horizontal lines at 60, 80, 90, and 96 denote respectively the collusive, standard duopoly
stage-game equilibrium, three-firm stage-game equilibrium, and two-phase duopoly stage-game
equilibrium output.
Figure 1.1: Average Total Output per Round, All Treatments
In other markets, total output is characterized by high volatility.
Table 1.4 lists the average total output (by phase), prices, seller profits, and mar-
ket efficiency by treatment. Average total output in the two-phase duopoly treatment
is not significantly different from average total output in the standard duopoly treat-
ment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.59). The total quantity in the three-firm treat-
ment is signficantly larger on average than the average total output in either duopoly
treatment (Wilcoxon rank sum tests, p < 0.01). In all three treatments, average total
output is significantly greater than the collusive output (60 units). In the two-phase
duopoly treatment, average forward sales (20.70 units) are significantly less than 48
units and spot sales are significantly greater than 48 units. Subjects sell significantly
more units in the spot phase than in the forward phase (see Table 1.5 for detailed
test statistics, paired t-tests yield the same results).
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics, Average Market Outcomes by Treatment
fj sj qj f s q p πj Efficiency
C2 - 37.61 37.61 - 75.33 75.21 44.79 1,572.79 84.52%
(5.59) (5.59) (14.94) (10.75) (10.75) (204.72) (6.52%)
FS2 10.35 28.08 38.43 20.70 56.17 76.87 43.13 1,522.62 85.20%
(7.99) (8.00) (4.99) (13.42) (13.67) (8.87) (8.87) (184.67) (5.34%)
C3 - 29.75 29.75 - 89.22 89.24 30.76 845.43 91.98%
(3.75) (3.75) (14.51) (8.42) (8.42) (175.75) (3.92%)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Each market (supergame) counts as a single observation
to control for possible correlation within a market.
Table 1.5: Z-Statistics of One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests (H0: Row Variable
= Column Value, Ha: Row Variable 6= Column Value) and Two-Sample Wilcoxon
Rank-Sum Tests (H0: Row Variable = Column Variable, Ha: Row Variable 6= Column
Variable)
48 60 80 90 96 qC2 sFS2 fFS2 qFS2 qC3
qC2 - 4.04*** -1.66* - - - - - -0.54 -3.87***
sFS2 2.54** -1.37 - - - - - 4.09*** - -
fFS2 -4.29*** - - - - - -4.09*** - - -
qFS2 - 4.14*** -1.16 - -4.29*** 0.54 - - - -3.99***
qC3 - 3.52*** - -0.49 - 3.87*** - - 3.99*** -
Note: p-values given beneath. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively. Each market (supergame) enters the tests as a single observation to control for
possible correlation within a market.
Table 1.6 contrasts market efficiency to the findings of Le Coq and Orzen (2006).9
Market efficiency in the standard duopoly treatments does not differ between the
9Le Coq and Orzen (2006) had four treatments: (1) standard duopoly, (2) two-phase duopoly, (3)
standard four-firm oligopoly, and (4) two-phase four-firm oligopoly with an inverse demand function
of the form p = 1, 000− q. The authors use a fixed-matching protocol with known-end termination
rule (25 rounds).
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studies (two-paired t-test, p = 0.70). However, market efficiency in the two-stage
duopoly treatment of Le Coq and Orzen (2006) is significantly higher than in this
study (two-paired t-test, p < 0.01). This comparison indicates that strict forward-
spot price parity significantly affects market-efficiency. In the set-up of Le Coq and
Orzen (2006), sellers could not play a cooperative strategy that involved forward sales.
Table 1.6: Market Efficiency by Treatment
This Study Le Coq and Orzen
C2 FS2 C2 FS2
Efficiency 84.52% 85.20% 83.73% 91.71%
(6.52%) (5.34%) (5.74%) (5.00%)
N 24 24 15 15
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Observations are likely dependent upon each other within a group of matched
subjects and across time. I account for these potential inter-dependencies using a
linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors. The model tests whether total
output and market efficiency differ across the three treatments. Table 1.7 shows the
estimation results. Specification 2 allows for a cubic time trend. Specification 3 allows
for the cubic time trend to differ between the duopoly treatments and for a quadratic
time trend in the C3 treatment. In all three specifications, total output and efficiency
in the three-firm treatment are significantly greater than in either two-firm treatment
(t-test with significance at the 1% level). However, the coefficient estimate on C2 is
not significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimates on the time trend terms
in specification 3 indicate that both output and efficiency exhibit oscillatory patterns
in the duopoly treatments. Efficiency in the three-firm treatment is increasing at a
decreasing rate over time.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Treatment on Total Output and Efficiency
Output Efficiency (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Constant 76.87*** 72.11*** 73.47*** 85.20*** 82.49*** 83.77***
(1.79) (2.38) (3.13) (1.08) (1.54) (2.01)
C2 -1.54 -1.50 -4.74 -0.61 -0.58 -3.62
(2.80) (2.80) (4.34) (1.69) (1.69) (2.98)
C3 12.35*** 12.37*** 8.73** 6.76*** 6.77*** 5.18**
(2.75) (2.75) (4.10) (1.45) (1.45) (2.52)
Round - 1.30** - - 0.82*** -
(0.53) (0.31)
Round2 - -0.09** - - -0.06** -
(0.04) (0.02)
Round3 - 2.0E-03* - - 0.0014** -
(1.1E-03) (0.0006)
C2·Round - - 2.09* - - 1.39***
(0.77) (0.52)
C2·Round2 - - -0.17** - - -0.11***
(0.06) (0.04)
C2·Round3 - - 0.004** - - 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001)
FS2·Round - - 1.54 - - 0.77
(0.95) (0.53)
FS2·Round2 - - -0.14* - - -0.07
(0.08) (0.04)
FS2·Round3 - - 0.003* - - 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001)
C3·Round - - 1.02*** - - 0.44*
(0.38) (0.21)
C3·Round2 - - -0.03** - - -0.012*
(0.01) (0.006)
F 13.65 7.26 4.36 15.11 7.45 4.30
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12
Note: N = 1, 682 (64 markets (supergames) with 24 (25) to 27 observations per market). FS2 is the
control group. Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of coefficient estimates at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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These findings indicate that there are no significant differences in total output and
efficiency between the two duopoly treatments. I conclude that
Result 1.1. Market efficiency (output) in two-phase duopolies is not different from
market efficiency (output) in single phase duopolies.
This result rejects hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. Further, I reject hypothesis 1.3. The
following two findings indicate why market efficiency does not differ across the two
duopoly treatments. First, on average, neither firm committed to any forward sales in
38% of individual two-phase duopoly stage-games which means that sellers faced the
single phase Cournot stage-game in more than one third of individual stage-games.
In 20 out of 24 markets, both firms avoided forward sales in at least one round. Both
firms sold in the forward phase in only 24% of all individual market outcomes. This
shows that the forward market does not necessarily create a Prisoner’s dilemma as
Allaz and Vila (1993) predict and previous experiments suggest (Le Coq and Orzen,
2006; Brandts et al., 2008). Second, as outlined in section 1.2, firms can sustain col-
lusive equilibria in the two-phase duopoly game even when they have short forward
positions. The following discussion examines the latter conjecture by analyzing strat-
egy choices in the spot phase of the stage-game. Recall that the experimental design
supports collusive equilibria with short forward positions, whereas previous designs
did not.
1.4.2 Strategy Choices
Figure 1.2 contrasts the distributions of chosen (stage-game) strategies in the duopoly
treatments. Standard normality tests suggest that both distributions have a positive
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of Strategies by Two-Firm Treatment
z < 0.01). Sellers chose the collusive and Cournot (stage-game) strategies most
frequently in both treatments. Whereas the difference between the collusive and
Cournot strategies is not significant in either treatment (two-sample Wilcoxon signed
rank test, zFS2 = 1.23, pFS2 = 0.22, zC2 = 0.74, pC2 = 0.46), all other differences
between strategies are significant at the 1% level within each treatment. In both two-
firm treatments, comparing the frequency of chosen strategies results in the following
order: Collude, Cournot > Defect >Punish > Zero.
The chart in Figure 1.2 also shows that sellers chose the collusive strategy more
frequently in the FS2 treatment than in the C2 treatment. Further, sellers chose the
defective and competitive strategies less frequently in the FS2 treatment than in the
C2 treatment. However, these differences are not significant (all strategies jointly:
Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 = 0.92, p = 0.34; individual strategies: test of proportions
with p-values ranging from 0.66 to 0.96). Note that decisions in the experimental
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markets are very heterogeneous. (Figures A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A.2 show
the distribution of chosen strategies by market.)
As a robustness check, I jointly test whether there are differences in distribution
of chosen (stage-game) strategies in a multinomial logit model with standard errors
clustered at the market level. Table 1.8 reports the estimation results. The coefficient
estimate on the C2 indicator variable is not significantly different from zero for all
strategies, which confirms that there are no significant differences in distribution
between the C2 and FS2 treatment. An interesting result is that sellers chose the
defective strategy less often in later rounds relative to the collusive strategy. Also,
in both treatments, sellers chose the zero output strategy (dominated strategy) less
often in later rounds.
Table 1.8: Effect of Type of Two-Firm Treatment on Strategy
Zero Cournot Defect Punish
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect
Constant -1.93*** -0.31 -0.79*** -2.13***
(0.33) (0.28) (0.29) (0.37)
C2 -1.09** -1.48% 0.09 0.93% 0.17 1.64% 0.34 1.72%
(0.53) (0.63%) (0.41) (7.39%) (0.44) (4.41%) (0.52) (2.75%)
Round -0.081*** -0.09% -0.002 0.12% -0.026* -0.32% -0.00003 0.04%
(0.022) (0.03%) (0.012) (0.25%) (0.015) (0.15%) (0.021) (0.12%)
Log-Likelihood = −3, 143.62; Wald χ2 = 35.82; N = 2, 520 (48 markets)
Note: FS2 is the control group. Base strategy is collude. The multinomial logit model estimates a
set of coefficients for each strategy other than the base strategy. Coefficient estimates for different
strategies are shown across columns. Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of
coefficient estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of strategies in the C3 treatment. Sellers chose
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Figure 1.3: Percentage of Strategies in C3 Treatment
Cournot strategies is not significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, z = −1.58, p =
0.11). Although subjects did not choose the collusive strategy significantly more
often than the defective strategy (z = 0.13, p = 0.90), they chose the Cournot
strategy significantly more often than the defective strategy (z = 1.97, p = 0.05). I
do not test for differences in strategy distribution between the C3 and the duopoly
treatments as the choice set in the C3 treatment consists of four choices only.
Next, I focus on the two-phase duopoly treatment only. To understand how for-
ward market outcomes affect the output decisions in the spot phase of the stage-game,
I analyze chosen spot-phase strategies conditional on the forward-phase outcome.
Figure 1.4 reports the percentages of subjects’ chosen strategies in the spot market
by forward market outcome. A given firm (subject) can observe the following four
forward-phase outcomes: (1) both the other firm and I sold 24 units each, (2) only
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Chosen Strategy in Spot−Market Phase
C2 (Spot Only)
FS2 Both Sold Fwd
FS2 Only Other Sold Fwd
FS2 Only Self Sold Fwd
FS2 No Fwd Sales
Figure 1.4: Percentage of Strategies by Two-Firm Treatment Conditional on Forward-
Market Outcome
I refrained from selling forward. The graph indicates two important findings. First,
if both firms sold forward they did not chose the Cournot strategy more often than
if neither of them sold forward. Second, if a firm sold forward, it chose to defect less
often. I test for differences in chosen strategies in the spot phase of the stage-game
conditional on the outcome in the forward phase using a multinomial logit model.
Table 1.9 reports the estimation results that allows for a linear time trend. The
binary variables ’Self Sold Forward’, ’Other Sold Forward’ and ’Self·Other’ uniquely
describe the four possible forward market outcomes. There are no observable differ-
ences between sellers choosing either the collusive or the Cournot strategy conditional
on the forward market outcome. However importantly, subjects were less likely to
choose the defective strategy if they sold in the forward market phase. Based on the
marginal effect, firms that hold forward positions are 15.7% less likely to defect in the
spot market relative to the collusive strategy. This finding indicates that a firm can
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commit to the collusive strategy more decidedly by selling forward. The following
two results summarize the findings of the two-phase duopoly treatment:
Result 1.2. In duopolies with a single forward market opening, the collusive outcome
can be sustained across both phases.
Result 1.3. A single forward market opening can soften competition in duopoly
markets.
Result 1.2 supports hypotheses 1.4 and 1.5. Overall, the experimental results
strongly suggest that forward markets may not have a pro-competitive effect. On
the contrary, a forward market can make it easier for firms to maintain the collusive
outcome.
Allowing subjects to play the punishing strategy (i.e. firms in a market produce
an equal share of the maximum demand) leads to behavioral phenomena such as
negative reciprocity. Some subjects play a collusive strategy in early rounds. Their
competitors, however, play the defective strategy repeatedly early in the supergame10.
Subjects then reciprocate by choosing the punishing output in later rounds. The
data reveals these patterns in several supergames in both duopoly treatments. This
behavior indicates that the punishing strategy is a viable grim strategy. The main
results are unaffected by this behavioral effect.
10A supergame refers to several consecutive rounds of the same stage-game in a group of matched
sellers
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Table 1.9: Effect of Forward Market Outcome on Spot Market Strategy Choice
Zero Cournot Defect Punish
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect Coefficient Effect
Constant -3.00*** -0.33 -0.56 -3.20***
(0.55) (0.46) (0.44) (0.60)
Self Sold 0.75 1.62% 0.02 3.21% -1.40** -15.70% 1.37** 7.46%
Forward (0.76) (1.37%) (0.57) (10.13%) (0.57) (4.56%) (0.67) (3.57%)
Other 0.62 0.90% -0.15 -9.35% 0.53 4.87% 1.97*** 10.29%
Sold Forward (0.70) (1.12%) (0.54) (9.50%) (0.52) (3.83%) (0.56) (2.63%)
Self·Other 0.52 0.68% 0.56 14.04% 0.11 -0.79% -1.75** -5.98%
(0.93) (1.57%) (0.81) (15.27%) (0.82) (5.77%) (0.86) (1.70%)
Round -0.068** -0.11% -0.007 0.03% -0.031 -0.28% -0.013 -0.02%
(0.028) (0.04%) (0.016) (0.33%) (0.020) (0.19%) (0.030) (0.12%)
Log-Likelihood = −1, 555.16; Wald χ2 = 193.13; N = 1, 296 (24 markets)
Note: Control group is no forward sales. Base strategy is collude. The multinomial logit model
estimates a set of coefficients for each strategy other than the base strategy. Coefficient estimates
for different strategies are shown across columns. Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of coefficient estimates at the 1% and 5% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I studied the strategic effect of forward sales on market efficiency and
firms’ output choices in infinitely repeated experimental duopoly markets. Although
there is considerable heterogeneity in market outcomes within each treatment, I ob-
tained the following robust results. First, a forward market does not act like additional
competitors in an infinitely repeated setting. This findings is in contrast with previ-
ous experimental work on forward markets. Second, several collusive equilibria can
be maintained in the presence of forward markets. Although I did not discover any
differences in market efficiency between duopoly markets with and without forward
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sales, I found evidence that forward sales commitments can strengthen collusion as
the defective strategy becomes less profitable in the spot-market. In my experiment,
the collusive effect outweighed the increased quantity competition effect.
The experimental design in this article differs from previous experimental studies
that test the strategic motive of forward contracts. One key design feature is that
subjects can play several cooperative subgame perfect strategies that involve forward
sales. Further, I impose strict forward-spot price parity to eliminate possible risk
hedging motives. I achieve forward-spot price parity by restricting subjects’ quantity
choices to a discrete choice set. These design features support four collusive equi-
libria in the forward market duopoly treatment that were not supported in previous
experiments.
The objective of this study was to design an environment that gives both the col-
lusive predictions of Liski and Montero (2006) and the pro-competitive predictions of
Allaz and Vila (1993) an equal chance. Nonetheless, the experiment abstracts from
one important characteristic of forward markets: uncertainty. Both buyers and sellers
can engage in forward contracts to hedge risk in future spot markets. Existing exper-
imental work suggests that uncertainty and noise can yield cooperative outcomes in
repeated Prisoner’s dilemma games (Rojas, 2012; Fudenberg et al., 2012). Therefore,
forward markets may increase the likelihood of collusive outcomes in the presence
of uncertainty. Given the experiment results, important subsequent inquiries are
whether and to what extent risk and uncertainty interact with the observed strategic
effects.
The results of this study can assist antitrust authorities in mitigating market power
in oligopolies that are characterized by few firms that interact repeatedly. A good
example is the wholesale electricity industry: few sellers, homogeneous products that
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cannot be stored economically at a large scale11, and sound forward markets. This
article confirms that merely requiring electricity generators to sell forward, with the
intent to limit their market power, can have the opposite effect as forward sales can
strengthen collusive outcomes. Without strict regulation, two ways to mitigate market
power in oligopolies are incentivizing entry and introducing forward markets. The
findings provide evidence that incentivizing entry can be a superior market mechanism
to forward markets.
11Two different spot markets are therefore independent markets and standard storage-based arbi-




Investor Behavior: Stock Market
Reactions to Ecological Disasters
2.1 Introduction
Ecological disasters, like the extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats fol-
lowing the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oilrig in 2010, initiate lively and
widespread debates about safety and sustainability concerns in relation to resource
extraction and energy production. The intensive media coverage, in turn, leads to in-
creased public awareness of the importance of environmental stewardship. Following
an ecological disaster, consumers and investors update their beliefs not only about
the vulnerability of ambient environmental quality but also about the impacts of
corporate actions on the environment (in the case of man-made ecological disasters).
Stock market movements can provide information about the consequences of an
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ecological disaster. Stock market movements may also indicate whether and to what
extent investors attribute importance to the cause of pollution and the associated loss
in environmental quality. In this article, I investigate whether ecological disasters
yield market-wide spillover effects. I analyze the stock market response to three
ecological disasters: the Iceland Volcano eruptions in 2010, the BP oil-spill in 2010,
and Hurricane Irene in 2011. All three disasters were well publicized in the media,
however, they differed in their cause and their impact on envrionmental quality. The
volcano eruptions were the results of seismic activity in Earth’s interior. The eruptions
led to the emission of carbon-dioxide and other greenhouse gases. The BP oil-spill was
a man-made disaster that caused widespread damages of beaches and marine habitats.
Hurricane Irene was a tropical cyclone that had neglible impacts on environmental
quality. Nonetheless, some argue that natural ecological disasters like Irene are likely
the result of global warming and as such society as a whole is responsible.1 Hence,
natural ecological disasters can heighten climate change awareness - there is empirical
evidence that there is a relationship between climate change awareness and investor
behavior (Jacobsen, 2011). However, Bulte et al. (2005) find evidence that willingess
to pay to offset offset naturally caused environmental damages is significantly lower
than willingness to pay to offset man-made environmental damages. I chose these
three distinct ecological events to shed some light on these possible cause-related
responses.
I conduct market-wide event studies that look at stock market reactions in indus-
tries that are not necessarily closely related to the disaster. Specifically, I examine
abnormal returns of the 500 biggest publicly listed companies in the U.S. (by market
1Following Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Bloomberg Businessweek ran a cover story titled“It’s Global
Warming, Stupid” which argued that there is strong link between global warming and the frequency
and severity of ecological disasters (Barrett, 2012).
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value). While some companies may be more closely associated to a disaster than
others, the majority of the companies are in unrelated industries. I examine whether
firms with lower environmental impacts (“green” companies) experienced relatively
higher abnormal returns than firms with higher environmental impacts (“brown”com-
panies). My empirical approach differs from previous event studies in that I identify
the extent to which investors care about companies’ environmental stewardship by ex-
ploiting variation in firms’ environmental performance. My empirical findings provide
some evidence that investors reward positive environmental performance. However,
this finding is not generalizable to all industries.
Previous research found that investors react to news about environmental pollu-
tion that is caused by publicly traded firms. These reactions translate into negative
abnormal returns for the polluting firms’ stock following publication of pollution news
(Hamilton, 1995). There is also evidence that these negative abnormal returns are
strongly correlated to the amount of media coverage and the magnitude of pollution
(Hamilton, 1995; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2010). Companies that violate envi-
ronmental laws and thus cause environmental pollution are subject to severe financial
obligations from legal and regulatory actions that translate into significant market
value losses (Karpoff et al., 2005). Stock market reactions in response to man-made
ecological disasters could theoretically be attributed to legal and reputational penal-
ties. However, Karpoff et al. (2005) find that polluting firms’ market value losses
result mainly from legal and regulatory penalties rather than reputational penalties.
Research on stock market reactions to violations of environmental regulation and
environmentally harm-inducing industrial accidents typically focuses only on the pol-
luting firms. Nonetheless, empirical work suggests that negative events send market-
wide signals about industry-specific risk and not just firm-specific risk (Knittel and
36
Stango, 2010). If an ecological disaster serves as a signal about industry-specific risk,
one would expect stock value changes within the pollution-causing industry. Following
the explosion of Deepwater Horizon, BP, plc stocks experienced negative cumulative
abnormal returns of about 3% during the week following the announcement of the
accident in the Wall Street Journal (Sabet et al., 2012)2. BP’s subcontractors expe-
rienced negative cumulative abnormal returns ranging form 2% to 4% (Sabet et al.,
2012). The oil spill also adversely affected other companies with offshore drilling
operations in the US (Heflin et al., 2011). Importantly, Heflin et al. (2011) also pro-
vide evidence that market value losses were less severe for companies with offshore
drilling operations that had detailed environmental disclosures. There is also empir-
ical evidence that ecological disasters can affect shareholder wealth outside the core
industry. For example, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 affected
the market value of companies in the nuclear energy industry and also in the energy
industry as a whole (Betzer et al., 2011; Ferstl et al., 2011; Lei et al., 2011; Lopatta
and Kaspereit, 2011; Mama and Bassen, 2013). Nonetheless, one important question
has not been answered: Do ecological disasters affect the market values of unrelated
firms and industries? If so, do these spillover effects differ in the environmental per-
formance of a company?
If investors care about the loss in environmental quality that is associated with
an ecological disaster, then they may reward firms that have a positive environmental
footprint and punish firms that have a poor environmental footprint even in unre-
lated (i.e. non-disaster) industries. There is empirical evidence that the diclosure of
environmental performance information significantly impacts companies’ shareholder
2The market value of BP, plc experienced an even greater drop of about 6% after the company
was publicly held responsible for future cleanup costs (on April 28) under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (BOEMRE, 2011).
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values (Lyon and Shimshack, 2012). Also, empirical work shows that consumers are
willing to pay more for goods that are linked to a cause (e.g. Elfenbein and Mcmanus,
2010). In particular, there is evidence that consumers are willing to pay premiums
for products that have lower environmental impacts (e.g. Casadesus-Masanell et al.,
2009). Research on environmentally friendly consumption of impure public goods
establishes a link between “green” preferences and the provision of environmental
quality (Kotchen, 2005, 2006). Consumers and investors may feel responsible for en-
vironmental damages following an ecological disaster and may want to compensate
for the losses through environmentally conscious purchasing and investment decisions
(Kotchen, 2009). In this article, I empirically test whether “green” preferences trans-
late into abnormal returns in the stock market following ecological disasters.
The article proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I discuss the conceptual background.
Section 2.3 describes the data and lays out the empirical specification. In section 2.4,
I present the results from my empirical analysis. I discuss the findings in section 2.5.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
There are several reasons why an ecological disaster can yield spillover effects into
unrelated industries. First, an ecological disaster likely affects investors’ expectations
about future environmental regulation which affects expected future dividends. Sec-
ond, an ecological disaster likely leads to changes in the demand for products and ser-
vices that companies offer, which also affects expected future dividends. If consumers
care about the environment, the demand for products with lower adverse environ-
mental impacts (during production or in use) likely shifts up, while the demand for
products with higher adverse environmental impacts likely shifts down. Third, since
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an ecological disaster also raises awareness about the vulnerability of ambient envi-
ronmental quality, investments in companies with higher environmental performance
may increase for altruistic reasons. Heinkel et al. (2001) develop a simple two-firm
equilibrium model of “exclusionary ethical investing” with a “green” technology and
a “brown” technology firm. The authors postulate that if a large enough fraction of
“green” investors refrains from investing in the “brown” company, then the “brown”
stock price will fall as a result of decreased risk sharing among investors.3
Assuming that stock markets are in equilibrium, an ecological disaster is an ex-
ogenous shock that can result in observable stock market reactions in the short run.
Potential stock price changes likely result from investors’ changed expectations about
future dividends that companies pay. Companies with lower environmental impacts
are more likely to meet tighter environmental regulation than companies with higher
environmental impacts. This yields an asymmetry in expected future dividends which
likely translates into positive abnormal returns for “green” companies and negative
abnormal returns for “brown” companies in the short run. Further, if investors be-
lieve that there is a large enough share of “green” consumers in the economy that will
demand more “green” products and less “brown” products, they likely shift invest-
ments from “brown” companies to relatively more “green” companies. Additionally,
if investors not only care about future dividends but also about the loss in ambient
environmental quality due to the ecological disaster (e.g. loss of wildlife habitats),
they may eschew “brown”company stocks and invest more in“green”company stocks.
However, it remains an empirical question how investors respond to ecological disas-
ters. I hypothesize that ecological disasters yield cumulative abnormal returns in
3Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide empirical support for this “ethical investment” hypothesis;
they show that norm constrained investors abstain from alcohol, tobacco, and gaming stocks which
translates into relatively higher expected returns for these stocks.
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unrelated industries and that these abnormal returns differ based on a company’s
environmental performance. Specifically, “green” companies will experience relatively
higher returns than “brown” companies.
Empirically, it is difficult to dissentangle the effects of investors’ changed expecta-
tions about future dividends and responsibility effects due to losses in environmental
quality. I explore these different channels by looking at disasters which differ in
their characteristics. A man-made ecological disaster likely results in tighter environ-
mental regulation than a natural ecological disaster. In addition, consumer demand
responses are likely stronger following a man-made disaster as willingess to pay to
offset man-made environmental damages likely exceeds willingness to pay to offset
naturally caused environmental damages (Bulte et al., 2005). Thus, it is more likely
to observe abnormal returns following a man-made ecological disaster than following
a natural disaster. Likewise, a natural disaster that causes environmental damages
more likely leads to observable abnormal stock returns than a natural disaster that
causes mainly material damages. However, if investors believe that the frequency
and severity of natural disasters is a consequence of human-caused climate change
then a natural disaster may translate into observable abnormal returns even if its
environmental damages are few. Therefore, I investigate different discrete events. I
conduct market event studies following the volcano eruptions in Iceland in 2010, the
BP oil-spill in 2010, and Hurricane Irene in 2011. I expect the BP oil-spill to have the
largest observable spillover effects. Further, I hypothesize that the volcano eruptions
yield observable abnormal returns that can be explained by differences in companies’
environmental performance. However, I do not expect to observe abnormal returns
following Hurricane Irene that can be explained by the environmental performance
score.
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2.3 Data and Empirical Method
In the empirical analysis, I use firm-specific financial data on the 500 biggest US com-
panies (by market value for the fiscal years 2009 and 2010). I obtained daily financial
market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) which I matched
with annual firm specific accounting data from CompuStat. Further, I obtained data
on these companies’ environmental performance from Newsweek’s Green Rankings
publication. Since 2009, Newsweek annually publishes detailed green rankings of
the 500 largest US publicly listed companies. In collaboration with KLD Research
and Analytics, Trucost, and CorporateRegister.com, Newsweek assessed firms’ envi-
ronmental disclosure, impact and management, which then entered a “green score”.
The green score is the statistical average of three components: (i) the environmental
impact score, (ii) the green policies score, and (iii) the reputation score. I take advan-
tage of variation in companies’ environmental impact score, which is a quantitative
performance measure that reflects a company’s environmental footprint under a “pol-
luter pays” system as a percentage of its annual revenue (Newsweek, 2009). Trucost
uses publicly disclosed environmental data such as carbon and other greenhouse gas
emissions, water use, solid waste disposal, metals and chemicals as scores in the en-
vironmental impact score. To avoid confusion, hereafter, I refer to this measure as a
company’s environmental performance score. On a 100-point scale, the highest possi-
ble score is 100 (most “green”) and the lowest possible score is 0 (least “green”). The
environmental performance for the companies included in the study is approximately
uniformly distributed over the interval 0 to 100 with a mean of 50.32 and standard de-
viation of 28.83. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present summary statistics for the 2009 and 2010
sample of included companies by industry sector. I follow the industry specification
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as published by Newsweek in their green rankings. The banks and insurance and the
financial services industries are the industry sectors with the highest environmental
performances. The food and beverage and the utilities industries are the sectors with
the lowest environmental performance scores in the sample.
Table 2.1: Industry-Specific Summary Statistics, Fiscal Year 2009
Mean Mean Mkt. Value† Mean Sales‡ Mean EpS?
Industry Firms Env. Performance (billion US$) (billion US$) (US$)
All 492 50.12% 20.65 17.63 2.00
Banks and Insurance 35 93.50% 26.91 27.44 1.02
Basic Materials 28 16.35% 11.44 8.56 1.24
Consumer Products, Cars 29 37.90% 15.17 14.47 1.62
Financial Services 29 84.50% 19.61 7.98 2.94
Food & Beverage 28 11.00% 22.39 15.47 2.69
General Industrials 27 32.93% 13.88 13.98 1.67
Health Care 27 67.13% 15.06 17.16 3.39
Industrial Goods 47 52.85% 8.84 8.84 1.60
Media, Travel, Leisure 33 55.92% 14.79 12.33 0.94
Oil and Gas 31 30.96% 35.36 30.66 1.39
Pharmaceuticals 15 46.53% 52.77 17.35 2.74
Retail 52 63.76% 15.75 32.62 2.20
Technology 53 68.33% 38.11 19.34 1.42
Transportation, Aerospace 21 48.19% 21.71 21.17 4.07
Utilities 37 11.68% 10.61 9.41 2.88
Notes: The 2009 fiscal year sample consists of 492 companies. The following eight firms (tickers)
had either missing accounting data or could not be matched to the market return data from CRSP:
BKC, FAF, FO, GENZ, KFT, LSTZA, SGP, and WYE.
†Market value equals to annual closing price (CompuStat variable 1,003) times common shares
outstanding (CompuStat variable 183).
‡Sales: CompuStat variable 749.
?Earnings per Share: CompuStat variable 294.
To study the stock market effects of ecological disasters, I conduct a market event
study (see Fama et al., 1969 and MacKinlay, 1997). For each company, I calculate
the daily average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return following
the ecological disaster. The abnormal return for a stock is the prediction error be-
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tween observed return and predicted returns based on the performance of the market
as a whole. Then, I explore the relationship between a company’s environmental
performance score and cumulative abnormal returns.
Table 2.2: Industry-Specific Summary Statistics, Fiscal Year 2010
Mean Mean Mkt. Value† Mean Sales‡ Mean EpS?
Industry Firms Env. Performance (billion US$) (billion US$) (US$)
All 489 50.46% 23.77 19.75 2.92
Banks and Insurance 39 79.26% 31.11 28.13 3.02
Basic Materials 27 16.90% 13.74 10.96 3.47
Consumer Products, Cars 30 43.99% 17.50 15.83 2.94
Financial Services 27 60.93% 23.12 9.85 4.04
Food & Beverage 26 10.25% 25.68 16.52 3.39
General Industrials 30 45.88% 15.39 13.57 2.29
Health Care 30 66.28% 13.69 17.75 3.32
Industrial Goods 40 56.84% 12.44 11.52 2.66
Media, Travel, Leisure 38 52.07% 17.61 12.92 2.21
Oil and Gas 28 32.55% 46.08 41.49 3.42
Pharmaceuticals 15 52.21% 50.77 20.45 2.54
Retail 56 60.33% 16.04 32.12 2.38
Technology 49 72.54% 45.61 2.32 2.71
Transportation, Aerospace 22 55.95% 22.39 20.96 4.47
Utilities 32 13.11% 12.12 10.55 2.31
Notes: The 2010 fiscal year sample consists of 489 companies. The following eleven firms (tickers)
had either missing accounting data or could not be matched to the market return data from CRSP:
BDK, BKC, CAL, EKDKQ, FO, GENZ, HEW.Z, KFT, LSTZA, and RGC.
†Market value equals annual closing price (CompuStat variable 1,003) times common shares out-
standing (CompuStat variable 183).
‡Sales: CompuStat variable 749.
?Earnings per Share: CompuStat variable 294.
2.3.1 Event Study Methodology
At any given time t, the observed returns of a given security j, Rj,t, can be expressed
as a function of the market return rate, Rm,t (CRSP Value Weighted Index or S&P
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500 Index)4:
Rj,t = αj + βjRm,t + εj,t, (2.3.1)
where αj is a security specific average daily return independent of general market
movements and εj,t captures any changes in security t’s daily return that cannot be
explained by either the security specific average daily return or by general market
movements. The prediction error êj,t is the difference between observed return at
time t and estimated return (abnormal return):
êj,t = Rj,t − α̂j − β̂jRm,t = ARj, (2.3.2)
where α̂j and β̂j denote the estimates of αj and βj, respectively.
Then, I calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each stock j for τ





To determine the drivers of cumulative abnormal returns following an ecological dis-
aster, I regress cumulative abnormal returns on the environmental performance score,
xej, and I include industry fixed effects, ϑk. In my extended second specification, I
allow for the effect of environmental performance to differ by industry:
CARjk,τ = ϑk +ϕ′xj +ψk′xej + εjk, (2.3.4)
where xj is a vector of firm-specific control variables. The firm-specific covariates
4The notation follows MacKinlay (1997).
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include the log linearized market value, log-linearized sales, and earnings per share
(analogous to Lyon and Shimshack (2012) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)). The
specification includes 15 industry fixed effects (vector ϑk) and 15 industry-specific
coefficient estimates for the environmental impact score (vector ψk).
2.4 Empirical Results
I report the empirical results of market event studies for three distinct ecological
events: the carbon-dioxide emissions following the Iceland volcano eruptions, the
BP oil-spill, and Hurricane Irene. The following market event studies are based on
the CRSP value-weighted index as market portfolio. As a robustness check, I also
conducted the analysis using the S&P 500 index as market portfolio, however, results
do not differ significantly (see Tables B.1 through B.5 in Appendix B.1). I report the
results based on a pre-event estimation period of 1 year (251 trading days). The results
based on a pre-event estimation period of half a year do not vary much quantitatively
or qualitatively (see section B.1.2 in the Appendix).
2.4.1 Eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull Volcano, 2010
In April 2010, volcanic events in Iceland at Eyjafjallajökull created a large ash cloud
which covered large areas of northern Europe from April 14-20, 2010. The volcano
emitted about 150,000 tons of carbon-dioxide per day (UNEP, 2011). The ash cloud
severely disrupted air travel to and from Europe for several days. The volcano erup-
tions were a naturally occuring ecological disaster (seismic activity) that caused losses
in ambient environmental quality (greenhouse gas emissions).
Table 2.3 presents the main regression results for an event window of six trading
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days following the eruptions (Wednesday, April 14 through Wednesday, April 21).
The first column in each specification lists the coefficient estimates. The second col-
umn in specification 2 shows the estimated cumulative abnormal returns evaluated at
the industry means, ĈARk = ϑ̂k + ϕ̂′xk + ψ̂kxek, for each industry k. The coefficient
estimate on environmental performance is not signifcant in the baseline regression.
However, looking at average cumulative abnormal returns within a given industry, the
results indicate that the volcano eruptions lead to positive cumulative abnormal re-
turns in the following industries: consumer products and cars, general industrials, and
transportation and aerospace. The average company in the basic materials, financial
services, and pharmceuticals industries experienced significant negative cumulative
abnormal returns. In the extended specification, the industry-specific environmental
performance coefficients suggest that positive abnormal returns in the transporta-
tion industry were greater for companies with a higher environmental performance
score. For example, cumulative abnormal returns of a transportation company were
six basis points higher for each one unit increase in the environmental performance
score. Similarly, companies in the basic materials and financial services sectors with
higher environmental performance scores experienced relatively higher returns. Note
that the coefficient estimate on environmental performance is significantly negative in
the health care industry. Overall, some environmental performance scores are signif-
icantly postive and some are significantly negative. There is not enough convincing
evidence that relatively more “green” companies fared better than “brown” companies
in industries with significant abnormal returns.
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Table 2.3: Iceland Volcano Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.06* (0.03) 0.99* (0.51)
Basic Materials - 0.11** (0.04) -2.75*** (0.75)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.05* (0.02) 1.91*** (0.49)
Financial Services - 0.12** (0.05) -1.39** (0.64)
Food & Beverage - -0.06 (0.07) -0.56* (0.34)
General Industrials - -0.03 (0.03) 2.16*** (0.65)
Health Care - -0.06** (0.03) -0.72 (0.50)
Industrial Goods - 0.03** (0.02) 0.56 (0.40)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.02 (0.04) -0.41 (0.80)
Oil and Gas - 0.04 (0.07) 0.50 (0.48)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.06 (0.07) -3.48*** (0.78)
Retail - 0.02 (0.05) 0.38 (0.43)
Technology - -0.03 (0.02) 0.47 (0.44)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.06** (0.03) 1.92*** (0.61)
Utilities - -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.33)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.12 (0.20) -0.10 (0.20) -
ln (Sales) 0.01 (0.21) 0.06 (0.21) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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I chose an event window length of six days that spans the time when the ash cloud
covered parts of Europe. The volcano eruptions were succeeded by another ecological
disaster (Deepwater Horizon explosion), which precludes an analysis with a longer
event window.
2.4.2 BP Oil Spill, 2010
The BP oil spill was a man-made ecological disaster which caused severe losses in am-
bient environmental quality (pollution of beaches, loss of marine wildlife and habitats,
damage to ocean floor). I give a brief chronology of the key events associated with
the oil spill. For a detailed timeline of events, see the joint report by the U.S. Coast
Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(BOEMRE, 2011).
• On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred on the deepwater oil drilling platform
Deepwater Horizon which subsequently caused crude oil to gush freely into the
Gulf of Mexico for several months.
• On April 22, the main operator, BP, plc (BP hereafter) reported the accident
in the Wall Street Journal.
• On April 29, President Obama declared the disaster a Spill of National Signifi-
cance and publicly held BP responsible for future cleanup costs, one day after
the National Pollution Funds Center declared BP a responsible party under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
• On May 27, the U.S. government released a moratorium on deepwater oil drilling
which went into effect on May 30.
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• On Saturday, May 29, BP announced that the top-kill procedure failed to stop
the flow of oil.
• On June 1, oil began washing up on the beaches of the Gulf Islands National
Seashore , by June 6, the oil spill had landed on the coast of Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, and Alabama.
• On June 16, BP established the Gulf Coast Claims Facility ($20 billion settle-
ment fund).
• On July 15, the wellhead on the ocean floor was capped.
In computing abnormal returns, I used a one-year estimation period from April 22,
2009 to April 21, 2010.
2.4.2.1 Deepwater Horizon Oilrig Explosion
First, I study the effect of information disclosure about the accident. While BP
made information about the accident available on Thursday, April 22, at the time,
the extent of the oil spill and resulting environmental damages were not predictable.
I chose event window lengths of 3, 6 and 11 days starting on April 23. The event
window of length 6 (11) spans over one (two) weeks following the information dis-
closure. Table 2.4 reports the main regression results for an event window length of
three days. The baseline model reports a significantly negative environmental per-
formance score. However, this result is likely driven by positive abnormal returns in
the oil and gas industry which has low environmental performance scores on average.
Average cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive in the basic materials,
media, travel, leisure, and oil and gas industries. The average oil and gas company
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in the sample experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns of 215 basis points
three days after the event. The average company in the banks and insurance, food
and beverage, retail, and transportation and aerospace industries had significantly
negative cumulative abnormal returns. The coefficient estimate on the environmental
performance score is significantly positive in the retail industry in specification 2.
For each one unit decrease in the performance score, cumulative abnormal returns
decrease by eight basis points. However, the environmental performance coefficients
are significantly negative in the financial services and transportation and aerospace
sectors. Companies with relatively higher market value experienced higher negative
abnormal returns (negative coefficient on log- market value).
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Table 2.4: Deepwater Horizon Explosion Estimates, 3-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR3d CAR3d Mean ĈAR3d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.01** (<0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - -0.04 (0.03) -1.45*** (0.43)
Basic Materials - -0.05* (0.03) 1.67*** (0.48)
Consumer Products, Cars - <0.01 (0.01) 0.72 (0.46)
Financial Services - -0.07** (0.03) 0.01 (0.58)
Food & Beverage - 0.05 (0.05) -1.59*** (0.25)
General Industrials - 0.01 (0.01) 0.68 (0.50)
Health Care - -0.03 (0.02) -0.80* (0.45)
Industrial Goods - -0.02* (0.01) 0.61 (0.37)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.02 (0.03) 1.50** (0.68)
Oil and Gas - -0.04 (0.05) 2.15*** (0.36)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.03 (0.03) -0.15 (0.48)
Retail - 0.08** (0.04) -0.63** (0.31)
Technology - -0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.27)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.06** (0.02) -0.60** (0.28)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.02) 0.15 (0.29)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.27* (0.16) -0.36** (0.17) -
ln (Sales) -0.01 (0.14) 0.08 (0.15) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
I replicated the analysis using event window lengths of six and eleven days. Ta-
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bles 2.5 and 2.6 report the results. Comparing the 3-day event window results to the
6-day results indicates that the observed effects did not persist one week following
the event. Negative returns for the average company in the food and beverage and
the retail industries were still significant yet smaller. However, the observed average
abnormal returns in the banks and insurance, basic materials, and transportation and
aerospace industries were no longer significant one week after the event. Average pos-
itive abnormal returns in the media, travel, leisure and oil and gas industry were still
weakly significant at the 10% level, yet smaller in magnitude. Importantly, comparing
the 3-day results to the 11-day results (Table 2.6) suggests that the event significantly
affected several industries’ abnormal returns. The average firm in the banks and in-
surance, basic materials, financial services, and the oil and gas industries experienced
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns two weeks after the event. Average
cumulative abnormal returns in the health care, retail, and technology sectors are neg-
ative. The industry-specific coefficient estimates on the environmental performance
score are insignifcant for most industries. The environmental performance coefficient
estimate is significantly negative for the financial services sector. However, companies
in the financial services industry have high performance scores with little varation rel-
ative to the 100-point scale. The environmental performance coefficient estimate in
the consumer products, cars and industrial sectors is significantly negative, although
average companies in both sectors did not have significant cumulative abnormal re-
turns. Note that cumulative abnormal returns are significantly negatively correlated
with earnings per share two weeks after the event. The 11-day window includes the
time period after president Obama publicly declared BP a responsible party under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. I look the impact of the declaration of responsible
parties in the next section.
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Table 2.5: Deepwater Horizon Explosion Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.04) -0.09 (0.64)
Basic Materials - -0.03 (0.03) 1.20* (0.62)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.04** (0.02) 0.91 (0.87)
Financial Services - -0.06 (0.06) 0.60 (0.72)
Food & Beverage - 0.04 (0.09) -0.94** (0.43)
General Industrials - 0.01 (0.04) 0.30 (0.94)
Health Care - -0.08* (0.05) -0.51 (0.62)
Industrial Goods - -0.05* (0.02) 0.60 (0.64)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.07* (0.04) 1.53* (0.90)
Oil and Gas - -0.07 (0.08) 1.86* (0.97)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.02 (0.06) 1.76** (0.80)
Retail - 0.09 (0.07) -2.35*** (0.59)
Technology - <0.01 (0.04) -1.50*** (0.54)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.02 (0.03) -0.39 (0.42)
Utilities - -0.03 (0.02) 1.38*** (0.52)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.14 (0.28) -0.25 (0.30) -
ln (Sales) 0.06 (0.27) 0.17 (0.29) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either time series: ACS, BRK3,
BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV, ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table 2.6: Deepwater Horizon Explosion Estimates, 11-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR11d CAR11d Mean ĈAR11d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.03** (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.11* (0.06) 4.75*** (0.84)
Basic Materials - -0.01 (0.04) 4.40*** (0.97)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.07*** (0.02) -0.34 (0.90)
Financial Services - -0.19*** (0.07) 3.51*** (1.11)
Food & Beverage - 0.11 (0.14) -1.30* (0.69)
General Industrials - <0.01 (0.05) -0.04 (1.40)
Health Care - -0.03 (0.06) -1.98** (0.85)
Industrial Goods - -0.08** (0.04) 0.65 (0.72)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.01 (0.05) 1.14 (1.05)
Oil and Gas - -0.06 (0.10) 2.96*** (0.91)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.05 (0.06) 1.24 (0.80)
Retail - 0.08 (0.08) -2.68*** (0.69)
Technology - -0.01 (0.03) -2.09*** (0.52)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.06 (0.05) -0.32 (0.69)
Utilities - -0.05 (0.04) 1.10 (0.68)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.24 (0.33 -0.30 (0.34) -
ln (Sales) 0.19 (0.31 0.28 (0.33) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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2.4.2.2 Declaration of Responsible Parties
To isolate the effect of the declaration of responsible parties from the effect of the
explosion, I conducted the main analysis using a 6-day event window that covers
Friday, April 30 through Friday, May 7. Table 2.7 presents the regression results. The
coefficient estimate on environmental performance is significantly negative in the basic
specification. The average company in the following industries had significant positive
returns six days after President Obama publicy declared BP a responsible party:
banks and insurance, basic materials, financial services, oil and gas, and utilities. The
average banks and insurance company had positive cumulative returns exceeding 600
basis points. The average company in the oil and gas industry experienced cumulative
abnormal returns of 220 basis points. The average company in the health care, retail,
and technology industries had significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns.
Note that cumulative abnormal returns are significantly negatively correlated with
earnings per share. The coefficient estimate on the environmental performance score
is significantly positive for the banks and insurance industry, however, the average
environmental performance score of companies in the banks and insurance sector was
93.50% with little variation relative to other companies in the full sample. The results
do not provide evidence that differences in the environmental performance can explain
the differences in cumulative abnormal returns.
Next, I analyze the stock market reaction to the failed top-kill procedure that
coincided with the oil-spill making landfall on U.S. beaches in the Gulf of Mexico at
the end of May (beginning of June).
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Table 2.7: Oil-Spill Responsibility Disclosure Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.03** (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.15** (0.06) 6.13*** (0.69)
Basic Materials - 0.01 (0.04) 3.73*** (1.11)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.04* (0.02) -1.09* (0.62)
Financial Services - -0.11* (0.06) 2.76*** (0.82)
Food & Beverage - -0.04 (0.13) -0.27 (0.60)
General Industrials - -0.03 (0.04) -0.72 (0.94)
Health Care - -0.03 (0.05) -2.69*** (0.56)
Industrial Goods - -0.05* (0.03) -0.23 (0.63)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.04 (0.03) -0.22 (0.62)
Oil and Gas - -0.03 (0.09) 2.20*** (0.69)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.03 (0.04) 0.04 (0.75)
Retail - -0.03 (0.04) -1.27*** (0.42)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) -1.72*** (0.43)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.03 (0.04) -0.18 (0.49)
Utilities - -0.04 (0.03) 1.06** (0.49)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.13 (0.25) 0.15 (0.26) -
ln (Sales) -0.01 (0.25) 0.01 (0.26) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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2.4.2.3 Oil-Spill Landfall on US Beaches
I chose event windows of four and nine days which cover one and two weeks after the
initial landfall of the oil-spill. Three events coincide: the top-kill procedure failed, oil
started washing up on U.S. beaches and the deepwater oil-drilling moratorium went
into effect. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the regression results. The coefficient estimate on
environmental performance is significantly positive at the 10% significance level which
indicates that companies with higher environmental performance scores experienced
relatively greater cumulative abnormal returns. Four days after the event, the aver-
age company in the basic materials, consumer products, cars, industrial goods, retail,
transportation and aerospace, and utilities industries had estimated significant neg-
ative cumulative abnormal returns. The average company in the food and beverage
industry had significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns. The coefficient es-
timates on environmental performance in the extended specification are significantly
positive for the health care and retail industries. For each one unit increase in the
performance score, abnormal returns were twelve basis points higher in the health
care sector. However, the abnormal returns for the average company in the health
care sector were not significant. In the retail industry, for each one unit increase in
the impact score, cumulative abnormal returns were eight basis points higher. Com-
panies with lower performance scores experienced relatively lower returns in these two
industries.
This relationship persists and is stronger in absolute terms two weeks after the
initial landfall. For each one unit increase in environmental performance, a company’s
estimated cumulative abnormal return increased by eleven (18) basis points in the
health care (retail) industry. Two weeks after the event, cumulative abnormal returns
were positively correlated with relative market value and negatively correlated with
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relative sales. In sum, the findings indicate that the BP disaster resulted in intra-
industry and outside-industry spillover effects. Some of the variation in cumulative
abnormal returns can be attributed to variation in environmental performance scores.
However, this finding is not generalizable to all industries in the sample.
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Table 2.8: Oil-Spill Landfall Estimates, 4-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR4d CAR4d Mean ĈAR4d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.01* (<0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - <0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.26)
Basic Materials - -0.02 (0.02) -1.78*** (0.48)
Consumer Products, Cars - 0.01 (0.02) -1.19*** (0.50)
Financial Services - 0.02 (0.03) -0.06 (0.41)
Food & Beverage - -0.06 (0.08) 0.72** (0.32)
General Industrials - -0.01 (0.02) -0.15 (0.45)
Health Care - 0.12*** (0.02) 0.17 (0.37)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.01) -0.88*** (0.31)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.01 (0.02) 0.49 (0.43)
Oil and Gas - 0.21 (0.15) 1.08 (0.99)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.05 (0.04) -0.70 (0.57)
Retail - 0.09*** (0.03) -1.38*** (0.40)
Technology - 0.03 (0.02) 0.49 (0.30)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.02 (0.02) -1.56*** (0.26)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.01) -0.69*** (0.21)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.30 (0.18) 0.28 (0.17) -
ln (Sales) -0.20 (0.19) -0.18 (0.17) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table 2.9: Oil-Spill Landfall Estimates, 9-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR9d CAR9d Mean ĈAR9d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.02 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.04) -0.80 (0.51)
Basic Materials - -0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.63)
Consumer Products, Cars - 0.05* (0.02) -2.04** (0.81)
Financial Services - 0.05 (0.04) -0.85 (0.56)
Food & Beverage - -0.16 (0.15) 1.95*** (0.56)
General Industrials - <0.01 (0.03) -0.57 (0.77)
Health Care - 0.11*** (0.03) -0.67 (0.52)
Industrial Goods - -0.03 (0.02) -1.14** (0.50)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.02 (0.02) -0.74 (0.67)
Oil and Gas - 0.20 (0.15) 2.89** (1.23)
Pharmaceuticals - -0.04 (0.08) 0.36 (0.83)
Retail - 0.17*** (0.06) -2.00*** (0.56)
Technology - 0.04 (0.04) -0.67 (0.56)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.03 (0.04) -2.25*** (0.55)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.03) 1.12*** (0.38)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.71*** (0.26) 0.65** (0.26) -
ln (Sales) -0.70*** (0.26) -0.64** (0.26) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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2.4.3 Hurricane Irene, 2011
From August 27-29 2011, Hurricane Irene’s destructive path covered areas in North
Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey and New York. Estimated damages around $15.6
billion (Avila and Cangialosi, 2012) make Irene the 7th costliest hurricane in U.S.
history. Irene damaged homes and led to catastrophic inland flooding in New Jersey,
Massachusetts and Vermont. Its environmental damages were mainly felled trees.
Irene was a natural disaster that caused minor losses in ambient environmental qual-
ity. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 present the regression results for event window lengths of
five and nine trading days. The environmental performance score coefficient estimates
are not statistically significant in the basic specifications. Note that one week after
the event, the average company in the basic materials, oil and gas, and utilities indus-
tries had significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns. The average company in
the financial services and transportation industries had significantly negative returns.
Transportation companies with lower environmental performance scores experienced
relatively lower abnormal returns. Utilities companies with lower environmental per-
formance scores experienced higher cumulative abnormal returns. However, variation
in environmental performance cannot explain cumulative abnormal returns in any
other sector.
Two weeks after the landfall, only average companies in the oil and gas, retail,
and the technology industries had significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns.
Note that neither the firm-level control variables nor environmental performance can
explain the variation of cumulative abnormal returns within industries.5
5Utilities companies with lower environmental performance scores experienced higher cumulative
abnormal returns. However, on average, utilities companies in the sample have low environmental
impact scores with little variation relative to other industries.
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Table 2.10: Hurricane Irene Estimates, 5-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR5d CAR5d Mean ĈAR5d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance <0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.03) 0.22 (1.02)
Basic Materials - -0.01 (0.02) 0.68** (0.32)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.01 (0.02) 0.10 (0.42)
Financial Services - <0.01 (0.02) -1.25** (0.53)
Food & Beverage - 0.09 (0.08) 0.46 (0.43)
General Industrials - -0.01 (0.02) -0.23 (0.53)
Health Care - 0.03 (0.02) -0.05 (0.36)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.02) -0.14 (0.42)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.01 (0.02) 0.75 (0.46)
Oil and Gas - <0.01 (0.02) 1.26*** (0.38)
Pharmaceuticals - -0.01 (0.02) 0.76** (0.32)
Retail - -0.04 (0.03) -0.37 (0.46)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) -0.34 (0.39)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.03*** (0.01) -1.06*** (0.34)
Utilities - -0.04** (0.01) 0.96*** (0.27)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.25 (0.19) -0.28 (0.20) -
ln (Sales) -0.05 (0.22) -0.05 (0.23) -




Notes: Event window is August 29 - September 2. Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The
second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry
mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: BEC, BDK, BKC, CAL, DTV,
EKDKQ, ETN, FO, GENZ, HEW.Z, KFT, LSTZA, MI., Q, RGC, SII, and THC.
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Table 2.11: Hurricane Irene Estimates, 9-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR9d CAR9d Mean ĈAR9d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance <0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.01 (0.04) 0.84 (1.11)
Basic Materials - -0.02 (0.02) 0.73 (0.59)
Consumer Products, Cars - <0.01 (0.02) -0.55 (0.53)
Financial Services - 0.01 (0.02) -0.59 (0.56)
Food & Beverage - 0.02 (0.09) -0.26 (0.49)
General Industrials - <0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.66)
Health Care - 0.03 (0.03) -0.95* (0.52)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.02) 0.08 (0.56)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.02 (0.03) -0.18 (0.73)
Oil and Gas - <0.01 (0.03) 1.49** (0.60)
Pharmaceuticals - <0.01 (0.03) 0.79 (0.72)
Retail - -0.03 (0.04) 1.08** (0.53)
Technology - -0.01 (0.04) 1.87*** (0.68)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.02* (0.01) -0.72 (0.49)
Utilities - -0.04*** (0.02) 0.26 (0.33)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.47* (0.26) -0.47* (0.27) -
ln (Sales) -0.21 (0.28) -0.25 (0.29) -




Notes: Event window is August 29 - September 9. Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The
second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry
mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: BEC, BDK, BKC, CAL, DTV,
EKDKQ, ETN, FO, GENZ, HEW.Z, KFT, LSTZA, MI., Q, RGC, SII, and THC.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I analyzed the stock market response to three distinct ecological dis-
asters. I investigated whether ecological disasters have market-wide impacts. I took
advantage of variation in the environmental impact score of publicly listed companies.
In my event studies, I found weak evidence that a company’s environmental perfor-
mance can significantly impact its stock market performance following an ecological
disaster even in unrelated industries. Further, I found that stock market reactions
differ based on the cause of the ecological disaster. The BP oil spill in 2010 had intra-
industry and outside-industry spillover effects. Relatively more “green” companies
fared better than “brown” companies in most of the affected industries. However, the
evidence is mixed. Companies with lower environmental performance scores experi-
enced relatively higher cumulative abnormal returns mainly in some industrial sectors.
The stock market response was strongest following the landfall of the oil spill which
caused pollution of beaches and losses of marine habitats and wildlife. Similarly, the
greenhouse gas emissions following the Iceland volcano eruptions in 2010 significantly
affected stock market values. Companies’ cumulative abnormal returns differed based
on their environmental performances. Again, the results are ambiguous. While envi-
ronmental performance was positively correlated with cumulative abnormal returns in
most industries with significant abnormal returns, health care companies with lower
environmental performance scores had relatively higher abnormal returns than health
care companies with higher performance scores.
In general, the findings suggest that losses in environmental quality can affect the
extent of stock market reactions. However, differences in companies’ environmental
impacts cannot explain variation in cumulative abnormal returns following Hurri-
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cane Irene in 2011. Irene was a natural disaster that may be attributable to climate
change. This suggests that consumers and investors are willing to compensate more
for environmental damages, in particular for those caused by humans, and either do
not associate natural ecological disasters with human-caused climate change or feel
less responsible for the consequences (which is in line with the findings of Bulte et al.
(2005)). Although the results are event-specific, this study provides some evidence of
the importance of corporate environmental performance. The findings indicate that
companies’ environmental performance matters to investors which supports previous
findings (Lyon and Shimshack, 2012). Given that the findings are somewhat am-
biguous, possible future avenues include exploration of alternative and more detailed
measures of companies’ environmental performance.
65
Chapter 3
Uncertainty and the WTA-WTP
Disparity for Private and Public
Goods
3.1 Introduction
Abundant empirical evidence from stated preference studies and experiments sug-
gests willingness to accept (WTA) significantly exceeds willingness to pay (WTP) for
quantity and price changes. Empirical studies report this disparity for goods rang-
ing from ordinary private goods to public goods (see Horowitz and Mcconnell (2002)
for an overview). The observed gap is particularly large for public goods which has
important implications for public policies that target reductions in health and safety
risk. The disparity also raises questions about the validity of methods used to esti-
mate WTA and WTP. Standard economic theory argues that WTA measures should
equal WTP measures for ordinary private goods apart from income and substitu-
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tion effects (Willig, 1976; Hanemann, 1991). For monetary lotteries however, the
welfare measures can differ if individuals’ risk preferences are not risk neutral. Alter-
native theories suggest that individuals’ asymmetric risk preferences relative to some
reference point can explain the disparity in some settings (e.g. Koszegi and Rabin
(2006)). However, economic theory typically cannot explain the magnitude of the
disparity or only applies to few contexts. A large WTA-WTP disparity has serious
welfare implications: initial allocation of property rights matters substantially and
Kaldor-Hicks compensation is no longer direction-neutral. Policy makers widely rely
on WTP estimates to assess the value of non-market resources. However, using WTP
estimates to establish compensation for environmental damages etc. may be flawed.
Importantly, to date, existing empirical and theoretical work paid little attention to
risk and uncertainty in the context of public goods. However, uncertainty is of great
importance for public policies that address risk reductions related to health and the
environment. The benefits of outcomes can vary across individuals or individuals may
perceive them differently.
In this study, I analyze the impact of uncertainty on the WTA-WTP disparity
using a set of incentive compatible laboratory experiments over money lotteries. The
experiments differ from previous work in that they provide a rigorous investigation of
the effect of uncertainty on the WTA-WTP disparity in the context of private goods
and public goods. In particular, the decision tasks involve scenarios where subjects
move from one state of uncertainty to another. This allows me to test whether
risk reductions and risk increases affect WTA and WTP differently. Existing lottery
experiments mostly involve risk increases and do not involve background risk. I also
test whether individuals have social preferences over relative gains and losses in both
expected values and risk changes in a public good setting.
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In a recent study, Plott and Zeiler (2005) (PZ) argue that experimental confounds
may explain anomalies in previous empirical studies. Using an incentive compatible
mechanism and avoiding“subject misconceptions”, the authors show that the disparity
disappears for ordinary private goods. However, following PZ elicitation procedures,
Isoni et al. (2011) observe a WTA-WTP disparity for private lotteries over money.
Other experimental studies with private lotteries find similar results (Harless, 1989;
Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Neilson et al., 2008; Schmidt and Traub, 2009). How-
ever, to date, there exists no comprehensive experimental study that addresses the
impact of uncertainty on the WTP-WTA disparity in the context of public goods.
Focusing on the importance of uncertainty, I study the effects of social efficiency mo-
tives. This is important in the context of public programs where respondents’ benefits
can differ widely (Messer et al., 2010). Further, public programs typically involve risk
or uncertainty in that they present individuals with policy lotteries over uncertain
outcomes. In the experiments, subjects make several buying or selling decisions for
private lotteries and public good lotteries. In the public good tasks, subjects are
matched with one other person and make a decision that affects both their own earn-
ings and the earnings of the matched person. The matched person cannot influence
the outcome of the decision. The treatments vary the level of uncertainty and hetero-
geneity of public good lotteries across individuals which captures inherent differences
that are characteristic for public programs.
In a recent working paper, Pahlke et al. (2012) study situations in which an
individual makes risky choices that affect the outcome of others. The authors find
that individuals display more risk aversion for gains and more risk seeking for losses
when being responsible for another person. However, importantly, their experimental
setup does not resemble a public program scenario: subjects are either decision makers
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or passive decision takers. The experimental design in this present study creates a
public good setting in the lab and it also has the advantage of eliciting WTA (WTP)
directly (i.e. elicitation of point values). In my experimental results, I find strong
evidence of a positive WTA-WTP disparity in the uncertainty tasks. This disparity
increases in the public good tasks. The findings from the heterogeneous public good
tasks suggest that individuals not only have social efficiency preferences but also social
risk preferences.
This article proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, I lay out a theoretical framework
and derive testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the experimental design and
method. I present the results in section 3.4. In section 3.5, I conclude and discuss
the main findings.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In the following section, I derive theoretical predictions with respect to uncertainty
for private lotteries following the notation of Abouda (2008). The theory differs
from previous work in that it considers scenarios where the decision maker’s initial
endowment may be a risky asset. The risk of the proposed alternative may therefore be
greater than (risk increase) or less than (risk decrease) the initial endowment. I show
that the WTA-WTP disparity depends on the decision maker’s degree of absolute




Let  be the individual’s transitive and complete preference relation over an asset ξ
which satisfies first-order stochastic dominance, continuity, and monotonicity. Con-
sider an individual with property rights to an initial asset, ε, who considers buying an
alternative asset α. Both initial and alternative assets can be lotteries or degenerate
lotteries. Let w ∈ R denote the individual’s initial wealth level.
Definition 1. The bid, b (w; ε, α), of asset α is the buying price such that
w + ε ∼ w − b (w; ε, α) + α.
The bid, b (w; ε, α), is the individual’s compensating surplus. Next, assume an
individual with property rights to the alternative asset, α, who considers selling the
alternative asset to own instead the initial asset, ε.
Definition 2. The offer, o (w; ε, α), of asset α is the selling price such that
w + α ∼ w + o (w; ε, α) + ε.
Offer o (w; ε, α) is the individual’s equivalent surplus. The following proposition
establishes a relationship between a parallel bid and offer, which reflects the income
effect (Willig, 1976).1
Proposition 1. b (w; ε, α) = o (w − b (w; ε, α) ; ε, α) and
o (w; ε, α) = b (w + o (w; ε, α) ; ε, α).
Proof. Definition 2 gives w−b (w; ε, α)+α ∼ w−b (w; ε, α)+o (w − b (w; ε, α) ; ε, α)+ε,
and by Definition 1 w + ε ∼ w − b (ω; ε, α) + α, thus w + ε ∼ w − b (w; ε, α) +
o (w − b (w; ε, α) , α) + ε; in order for this to hold, it must be that b (w; ε, α) =
o (w − b (w; ε, α) ; ε, α). Likewise, Definition 1 gives w+o (w; ε, α)+ε ∼ w+o (w; ε, α)−
1Substititution effects do not matter in this setting as goods are lotteries with perfect substitutes.
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b (w + o (w; ε, α) ; ε, α)+α, and by Definition 2 w+α ∼ w+o (w; ε, α)+ε, and there-
fore w+ α ∼ w+ o (w; ε, α)− b (w + o (w; ε, α) ; ε, α) + α; it follows that o (w; ε, α) =
b (w + o (w; ε, α) ; ε, α).
Definition 3. (Pratt, 1964) An individual is weakly risk averse if she always prefers
the expected value of an asset to the asset itself, E [ξ]  ξ, ∀ξ,
where E [·] denotes the expectation operator.
Definition 4. An individual is risk neutral if E [ξ] ∼ ξ, ∀ξ.
Next, I define the risk premium so that I can quantify the impact of the income
effect.
Definition 5. (Pratt, 1964) The risk premium, π (w, ξ), of asset ξ is the money
amount such that w + ξ ∼ w + E [ξ]− π (w, ξ).
The risk premium is the maximum amount the individual is willing to pay to own
the expected value of the asset instead of the asset itself, given her initital level of
wealth, w.
Definition 6. (Pratt, 1964) The certainty equivalent, c (ξ), of asset ξ is the money
amount such that w + ξ ∼ w + c (ξ).
It follows that an individual with weakly risk averse preferences has a positive risk
premium, π (·) ≥ 0, as w+E [ξ] ≥ w+ c (ξ) , ∀ξ, ∀w ∈ R.2 A risk neutral individual’s
risk premium is equal to zero. Also, the risk premium is an increasing function in
risk. Next, I define measures of absolute risk aversion following Pratt (1964).
Definition 7. An individual’s risk preferences satisfy constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) if w + t+ ξ ∼ w + t+ c (ξ) , ∀t ∈ R, ∀ξ,
2π (w, ξ) = 0 for all degenerate lotteries, ξ, as c (ξ) = E [ξ].
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Definition 8. An individual’s risk preferences satisfy DARA if w + t+ ξ  w + t+
c (ξ) , ∀t > 0, ∀ξ.
Next, I derive expressions for the optimal bid and offer functions, b∗ (w; ε, α) and
o∗ (w; ε, α) in terms of the risk premium. Let µξ = E [ξ] and σξ =
√
V ar [ξ] denote the
expected value and standard deviation of an asset ξ, respectively. Define ∆µ ≡ µα−µε
as the difference in expected value between the initial asset and the alternative asset.
Assuming independence of outcomes between assets ε and α, define ∆σ ≡ σα− σε as
the difference in standard deviations. I can express the expected value and standard
deviation of the alternative asset in terms of µε and σε as follows
µα = µε +∆µ (3.2.1)
σα = σε +∆σ. (3.2.2)
In the following derivations, I only consider positive differences in expected value,
∆µ ≥ 0 (expected gains in WTP).
Willingness to Pay
The risk premium for asset ε is, given initial wealth w, is
w + ε ∼ w + µε − π (w, ε) . (3.2.3)
Using Definition 1 this is equivalent to
w + µε − π (w, ε) ∼ w − b (w; ε, α) + α. (3.2.4)
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The risk premium for asset α, given initial wealth w− b (w; ε, α), is the amount such
that
w − b (w; ε, α) + α ∼ w − b (w; ε, α) + (µε +∆µ)− π (w − b (w; ε, α) , α) . (3.2.5)
Comparing expression 3.2.4 to expression 3.2.5 gives
w + µε − π (w, ε) ∼ w − b (w; ε, α) + (µε +∆µ)− π (w − b (w; ε, α) , α) . (3.2.6)
For this to hold, it must be that
− π (w, ε) = ∆µ− b (w; ε, α)− π (w − b (w; ε, α) , α) . (3.2.7)
Solving for b (·) gives the optimal bid
b∗ = ∆µ+ [π (w, ε)− π (w − b (w; ε, α) , α)] . (3.2.8)
Expression 3.2.8 states that the individual’s bid (maximum buying price) is the sum of
the difference in expected payouts, ∆µ, and the difference in risk premia between the
initial and the alternative asset. For an individual with risk neutral preferences, the
bid is simply the difference in expected payouts, ∆µ, since π (w, ξ) = 0, ∀w ∈ R, ∀ξ.
If the alternative asset is a degenerate lottery, then equation 3.2.8 simplifies to
b∗ (w; ε, α) = ∆µ+ π (w, ε) . (3.2.9)
A weakly risk-averse individual increases her bid above the difference in expected
payouts to avoid the risk of the initial asset and own the certain alternative instead.
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Conversely, if the initial asset is a degenerate lottery, she decreases her bid below the
difference in expected payouts:
b∗ (w; ε, α) = ∆µ− π (w − b∗ (w; ε, α) , α) . (3.2.10)
If both assets are non-degenerate lotteries, the invididual’s bid can be less than or
greater than the difference in expected payouts.
In general, the optimal bid of a weakly risk averse individual decreases (increases)
as the relative risk increases (decreases). Also, the increase in the bid associated
with a risk decrease is smaller in magnitude than the decrease in the bid for an
equivalent risk increase. Let ε, α1, α2 denote assets such that µ
α1 = µα2 > µε,
σα1 > σε > σα2 where (σα1 − σε) = (σε − σα2) > 0. It follows from equation 3.2.8
that b∗ (w; ε, α1)− b∗ (w; ε, α2) = −π (w − b∗ (w; ε, α1) , α1) + π (w − b∗ (w; ε, α2) , α2).
This difference is less than zero for a weakly risk-averse individual with CARA or
DARA as the risk premium is an increasing function in risk. Note that this asymmetry
is greater for an individual with DARA as the risk premium is decreasing in wealth.
Willingness to Accept
To derive an expression for the optimal offer (maximum selling price), I express the
optimal bid function in terms of the optimal offer.3 Let w + o∗ (w; ε, α) denote the
initital wealth, then expression 3.2.8 becomes
b∗ (ω + o∗ (w; ε, α) ; ε, α) = ∆µ+ π (w + o∗ (w; ε, α) , ε) (3.2.11)
− π (w − b (w + o∗ (w; ε, α) ; ε, α) + o∗ (w; ε, α) , α) .
3Alternatively, I can use definition 2 and definition 5 to derive the optimal offer.
74
Following proposition 1, this simplifies to
o∗ (w; ε, α) = ∆µ+ [π (w + o∗ (w; ε, α) , ε)− π (w, α)] . (3.2.12)
Expression 3.2.12 states that the individual’s offer (maximum selling price) is the
sum of the difference in expected payouts, ∆µ, and the difference in risk premia
between the initial asset and the alternative asset. For an individual with risk neu-
tral preferences, the offer is simply the difference in expected payouts, ∆µ, since
π (w, ξ) = 0, ∀w ∈ R, ∀ξ. If the alternative is a degenerate lottery, then equation
3.2.12 simplifies to
o∗ (w; ε, α) = ∆µ+ π (w + o∗ (w; ε, α) , ε) (3.2.13)
A weakly risk-averse utility maximizer increases her offer above the difference in
expected payouts to obtain the risky initial asset instead of the certain alternative.
Conversely, if the initial asset is a degenerate lottery, she decreases her offer below
the difference in expected payouts to obtain the certain initial asset and part with
the risky alternative:
o∗ (w; ε, α) = ∆µ− π (w, α) (3.2.14)
If both assets are non-degenerate lotteries, the invididual’s offer can be less than or
greater than the difference in expected payouts.
In general, the optimal offer of a weakly risk-averse individual decreases (increases)
as the relative risk increases (decreases). Also, the increase in the bid associated
with a risk decrease is smaller in magnitude than the decrease in the bid for an
equivalent risk increase. Let ε1, ε2, α denote assets such that µ
ε1 = µε2 < µα, σε1 >
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σα > σε2 where (σα − σε1) = (σε2 − σα) < 0. It follows from equation 3.2.12 that
o∗ (w; ε1, α) − o∗ (w; ε2, α) = π (w + o∗ (w; ε1, α) , ε1) − π (w + o∗ (w; ε2, α) , ε2). This
difference is greater than zero for a weakly risk-averse individual with CARA or DARA
as the risk premium is an increasing function in risk. Note that this asymmetry is
greater for an individual with DARA as the risk premium is decreasing in wealth.
WTP and WTA Disparities
Substracting the optimal bid (WTP) from the optimal offer (WTA) gives
o∗ (w; ε, α)− b∗ (w; ε, α) = [π (w + o (w; ε, α) , ε)− π (w, ε)] (3.2.15)
+ [π (w − b (w; ε, α) , α)− π (w, α)] .
For a risk neutral individual this difference is equal to zero.
Proposition 2. WTA equals WTP for an individual with risk neutral preferences,
o∗ (w; ε, α)− b∗ (w; ε, α) = 0.
Proof. Risk neutrality implies π (w, ξ) = 0, ∀w ∈ R, ∀ξ, and therefore o∗ (w; ε, α) −
b∗ (w; ε, α) = 0.
Proposition 3. If the individual’s risk preferences satisfy CARA then o∗ (w; ε, α)−
b∗ (w; ε, α) = 0.
Proof. One can show that if an individual’s risk preferences satisfy CARA then her
risk premium is constant in income. Then, π (w + o (·) , ε)−π (w, ε) = 0 and π (w, α)−
π (w − b (·) , α) = 0 and, thus b∗ (·)− o∗ (·) = 0.
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Proposition 4. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) The optimal offer is less than the optimal bid for any assets ε, α that satisfy
µα ≥ µε, σε > 0, σα = 0: o∗ (w; ε, α)− b∗ (w; ε, α) < 0 and
the optimal offer is greater than the optimal bid for any assets ε, α that satisfy µα ≥
µε, σε = 0, σα > 0: o∗ (w; ε, α)− b∗ (w; ε, α) > 0.
(ii) The individual’s risk preferences satisfy DARA.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii)
Case 1: (σε > 0, σα = 0) o∗ (·) − b∗ (·) = π (w + o∗ (·) , ε) − π (w, ε) < 0, implies
that the risk premium is a decreasing function of wealth. One can show that a risk
premium that is decreasing in wealth is equivalent to the individual having DARA
risk preferences (see Abouda (2008) for proof).
Case 2: (σε = 0, σα > 0) o∗ (·)− b∗ (·) = π (w, α)− π (w − b∗ (·) , α) > 0, implies that
the risk premium is a decreasing function of wealth, which is equivalent to DARA
risk preferences.
(ii)⇒ (i) If the invidiual satifies DARA then the risk premium is a decreasing function
of wealth.
Case 1: (σε > 0, σα = 0) o∗ (·)− b∗ (·) = π (w + o∗ (·) , ε)− π (w, ε) < 0.
Case 2: (σε = 0, σα > 0) o∗ (·)− b∗ (·) = π (w,−b∗ (·) , α)− π (w, α) > 0.
The general case, where neither the initial asset nor the alternative are degenerate
lotteries, is ambiguous under DARA. I will use examples within the expected utility
framework to illustrate the disparity between WTA and WTP when both assets are
uncertain. First, consider a pure risk decrease in WTP.4
4Davis and Reilly (2012) mention the possibility of a negative WTA-WTP disparity with uncer-
tainty for changes in quantity.
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Example 1. Set w = $0 and let ε1 = [$0, $8; 0.5, 0.5] and α1 = [$2, $ 6; 0.5, 0.5]
(µε1 = µα1 = $4, σε1 = $4 > $2 = σα1). Further let the individual’s Bernoulli utility
function be u (x) = x1−r/ (1− r) , x ∈ R with r = 0.535 (this utility function satisfies
DARA). The optimal bid, b ($0; ε1, α1) = $1.60, is greater than the corresponding
offer, o ($0; ε1, α1) = $0.84.
Next, consider a relative risk increase in WTP6.
Example 2. Set w = $0 and let ε2 = [$2, $6; 0.5, 0.5] and α2 = [$2, $ 10; 0.5, 0.5]
(µε2 = $4, µα2 = $6, σε2 = $2 < $4 = σα2). Again, let the individual’s Bernoulli
utility function be u (x) = x1−r/ (1− r) , x ∈ R with r = 0.53. The optimal bid,
b ($0; ε2, α2) = $1.16, is less than the corresponding offer, o ($0; ε2, α2) = $1.39.
3.2.2 Public Goods
There are several theoretical frameworks that model an individual’s behavior toward
others. Here, I discuss the widely-applied models of Charness and Rabin (2002)
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that individuals’
preferences are driven by social efficiency concerns and that inidividuals want to
maximize the welfare of the worst-off individual. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that
individuals are averse to inequality among individuals (the inequality model of Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) gives similar predictions). Note that none of the models assume
uncertainty. Therefore, I express the bid and offer functions in terms of expected
gains only. In the following derivations, assume for simplicity that w1 = w2 = 0.
5Parameter estimate from Harrison and Rutström (2008).
6Note that a pure risk increase in WTP is equivalent to short buying; however, in this study I
only consider gains in WTP.
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Social Efficiency
Consider an individual with property rights to asset an asset, ε1, who considers buying
an alternative asset, α1. Importantly, her decision now also affects whether a second
individual with property rights to asset, ε2, will buy an alternative asset, α2. That
is, the first individual makes a pivotal buying decision. Let p = [ε1, α1; ε2, α2] =
p [∆µ1, ∆µ2] denote this public program, where ∆µi = (µ
αi − µεi) , i = 1, 2. Let
the decision making individual’s utility function be of the following form u (x) =
u (x1 + λx2) , where λ ≥ 0 denotes the level of altruism toward the other individual
(Charness and Rabin, 2002).
Definition 9. The socially efficient bid, bs (p), of public program p is the buying
price such that u (µε1 + λµε2) = u (µα1 − bs (p) + λ (µα2 − bs (p))).
The socially efficient bid can be written as (applying the inverse of the utility





Next, consider an individual with property rights to asset, α1, who considers selling
the alternative asset to own the asset, ε1, instead. Importantly, her decision now also
affects whether a second individual with proptery right to asset, α2, will sell asset α2
to own asset ε2 instead (pivotal selling decision).
Definition 10. The socially efficient offer, os (p), of public program p is the selling
price such that u (µα1 + λµα2) = u (µε1 + os (p) + λ (µ
ε2 + os (p))).
The socially efficient offer can be written as (applying the inverse of the utility
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which is equal to the socially efficient bid. The bid (offer) increases in the other
person’s relative expected gain.
Maximin Preferences
The bid and offer functions for maximin preferences have the same form as the socially
efficient bid function if the other individual’s payoffs (initial and alternative) are less
than the decision making individual’s payoffs, µε2 < µε1 and µα2 < µα1 . If the other
person’s payoffs are greater, then the individual’s bid (offer) will be equal to her
private bid (offer). However, there can be a disparity between bid and offer if the
other person is not always worse off:
b∗m (p) =

∆µ1 − κ · µε2 : µε2 < µε1 , µα2 ≥ µα1





(∆µ1 − κ · µε2) / (1 + κ) : µε2 < µε1 , µα2 ≥ µα1
∆µ1 + κ · µα2 : µε2 ≥ µε1 , µα2 < µα1
, (3.2.19)
where κ ≥ 0. This implies that o∗m (p) ≥ b∗m (p) if µε2 ≥ µε1 , µα2 < µα1 and o∗m (p) ≤
b∗m (p) if µ
ε2 < µε1 , µα2 ≥ µα1 . That is, heterogeneity in initial payouts can yield a
negative WTA-WTP disparity if the other person’s initial payout is less. Similarly,
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heterogeneity in alternative payouts can yield a positive WTA-WTP disparity if the
other person’s alternative payout is less. In general, with heterogeneous payouts, the
bid (offer) will differ from the difference in the individual’s expected payout. Note
that quasi-maximin preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002) are a combination of
social efficiency and maximin preferences that result in a similar disparity if the other
person is not always worse off.
Fairness
Let the individual’s utility function be of the following form u1 (x) = x1 − ζ ·
max {0, x2 − x1}−η·max {0, x1 − x2} , where η ≤ ζ and ζ ∈ [0, 1) (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). The individual gets disutility if her own payoff differs from the other person’s
payoff. The disutility is greater when the individual’s payoff is less than the other
person’s payoff compared to when her payoff is greater.
Definition 11. The fair bid, bf (p), of public program p is the buying price such that
µε1−ζ·max {0, µε2 − µε1}−η·max {0, µε1 − µε2} = µα1−bf (p)−ζ·max {0, µα2 − µα1}−
η ·max {0, µα1 − µα2}.
Let δµα = µα2 − µα1 and δµε = µε2 − µε1 . The fair bid can then be written as
b∗f (p) = ∆µ1 − ζ · (max {0, δµα} −max {0, δµε}) (3.2.20)
− η · (min {0, δµα} −min {0, δµε}) .
Definition 12. The fair offer, of (p), of public program p is the selling price such
thatw1 + µ
α1 − ζ ·max {0, µα2 − µα1} − η ·max {0, µα1 − µα2} = w1 + µε1 + of (p)−
ζ ·max {0, µε2 − µε1} − η ·max {0, µε1 − µε2} .
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The fair offer can be written as
o∗f (p) = ∆µ1 − ζ · (max {0, δµα} −max {0, δµε}) (3.2.21)
− η · (min {0, δµα} −min {0, δµε}) ,
which is equivalent to the fair bid. Here, heterogeneous payouts across individuals
can result in asymmetric increases or decreases in bids (offers).
Example 3. Let µε1 = µε2 = $4 and µα1 = $8, µα2 = $6 (∆µ1 = $2, δµ
ε = $0 and
δµα = −$2). The fair bid is b∗f = o∗f = $2− η · $2 < $2, η > 0.
Example 4. Let µε1 = µε2 = $4 and µα1 = $8, µα2 = $6 (∆µ1 = $2, δµ
ε = $0 and
δµα = $2). The fair bid is b∗f = o
∗
f = $2− ζ · $2 ≤ $2− η · $2 < $2, ζ ≥ η > 0.
To summarize, neither social efficiency nor fairness predict a WTA-WTP disparity.
Maximin preferences (and quasi-maximin preferences) predict a positive (negative)
WTA-WTP disparity only if the other person is worse off with the initial (alternative)
payoffs.
3.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design consists of two main conditions: (1) WTA and (2) WTP
(between subject design). In each condition, participants first obtain property rights
to an asset which is either a sure amount of money or a symmetric, binary lottery (50-
50 chance). In WTA, participants then have the opportunity to sell their property
rights and obtain rights to another asset instead (sure amount of money or 50-50
lottery). If they sell, they give up their inital property rights and receive a selling
price for the transaction. In WTP, participants have the opportunity to purchase
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property rights to an alternative asset. If they purchase, they give up their property
rights to their initial asset to obtain the alternative instead and pay a buying price for
the transaction. Within each of these two main treatments, the experiment consists
of three parts (within-subject design within each main treatment):
1. Training Tasks: Participants make six individual buying (selling) decisions
over certain, low stakes payouts (i.e. degenerate lotteries).
2. Private Good Tasks: Participants make eight individual buying (selling)
decisions over high stakes payouts and high stakes lotteries. The individual
high stakes tasks vary the difference in expected payout, ∆µ, and the difference
in standard deviation between initial and alternative asset, ∆σ.
3. Public Good Tasks: Participants make a total of 23 group buying (selling)
decisions over high stakes payouts and high stakes lotteries in groups of two
(Public Good tasks). The bids (offers) affect not only the decision maker but
also a second person. Importantly, the other person has no opportunity to affect
the outcome of a buying (selling) decision. The group high stakes tasks vary
the difference in expected payout, ∆µ, and the difference in standard deviation
between initial and alternative asset, ∆σ, for both the decision maker, and the
other matched person. Participants make decisions on
(a) eight homogeneous tasks (the decision maker’s initial and alternative assets
are the same as the other person’s assets) and
(b) 15 heterogeneous tasks (the decision maker’s initial and alternative assets
are different than the other person’s assets).
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The private and public good tasks vary expected payouts and levels of uncertainty
(standard deviation) between the initial and the alternative asset. Hereafter, I refer
to the types of variations as treatments (within-subject). Table 3.1 shows the main
treatments.
I use the Becker et al. (1964) (BDM) mechanism to elicit bids (offers). With the
BDM mechanism, bids (offers) are compared to a randomly chosen price. In the WTP
tasks, if the bid greater than or the same as the randomly chosen price, a buy will
take place. In the WTA tasks, if the offer is less than or the same as the randomly
chosen price, a sale will take place. In the WTP (WTA) training tasks, the BDM
price was drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [$0.01, $1.10] ([$0, $1.09])
in one cent increments. In the high stakes WTP (WTA) tasks, the random price was
drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [$0.01, $12] ([$0, $11.99]) in one
cent increments.
Table 3.1: Treatment Categories by Welfare Change and Risk Change
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5†
∆µ ⊕ ◦ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
∆σ ◦ 	 	 	 ⊕	
† Heterogeneous public good task only
The following subsections provide details on the construction of the assets (lotter-
ies) in the experiment.
3.3.1 Asset Choices
The computer progam generates the initial and alternative assets during a session.
In both private good and public good tasks, the assets are either certain payouts or
binary lotteries. Both states of any given lottery have a 50% chance of occurring.
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The expected value of the initial asset is $4. The expected value of the alternative
asset is in the range of [$5, $12] (except for treatment 2 in Table 3.1). The standard
deviation of an asset is in the range of [$0, $4]. For assets where σ 6= 0, the lower
payout is constructed by subtracting the standard deviation from the expected payout.
Likewise, the higher payout is constructed by adding the standard deviation to the
expected payout. Thus, all risky assets are symmetric, binary lotteries with a spread
of 2σ between low and high payout.
3.3.1.1 Training Tasks
In the training tasks, the computer sets the certain payout of the initial asset by ran-
domly drawing a number from a uniform distribution on the interval [$0.05, $0.50] in
5 cent increments. For the alternative asset’s certain payout, the computer randomly
draws a number from a uniform distribution on the interval [$0.55, $1], again in 5 cent
increments. Note that the intervals of the initial and alternative asset do not overlap.
3.3.1.2 Private Good Tasks
Table 3.2 lists the asset parameters for the private good tasks. In each task, the initial
asset (Status Quo in WTP, Alternative in WTA treatment) has an average payout of
four dollars. The computer program sets the average payout of the alternative asset
(Alternative in WTP, Status Quo in WTA treatment) based on the parameters given
in Table 3.2. The computer draws the difference in average payouts between initial
and alternative asset from a uniform distribution in one dollar increments (except for
tasks 3 and 4). The program then sets the standard deviation of the initial asset, σε,
according to the parameters and calculates the standard deviation of the alternative
asset. The standard deviation values are drawn from a uniform distribution in 50 cent
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increments. Note that the difference in expected payouts is non-negative in all tasks.
The tasks that vary the standard deviation between initial and alternative assets such
that ∆σ < 0 if ∆µ ≥ 0 and ∆σ < 0 only if ∆µ > 0 (i.e. the alternative is a “good” in
that expected payout increases when risk increases). Put differently, none of the tasks
are short buying (selling) tasks. In tasks 1 and 2 only the expected payout changes
between initial and alternative asset. In tasks 3 and 4 only the standard deviation of
the initial and alternative asset changes. In all other tasks, both the expected payout
and the standard deviation changes between initial and alternative asset.
Table 3.2: Treatment Parameters, Individual (Homogeneous Group) Tasks
# Treatment µε ∆µ σε ∆σ
1 1 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] $0 $0
2 1 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] ∼ U [$0.5, $4] $0
3 2 $4 $0 ∼ U [$0.5, $4] −σε
4 2 $4 $0 ∼ U [$0.5, $4−∆σ] +∆σ ∼ U [$0.5, $3.5]
5 3 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] $0 ∼ U [$0.5, $4]
6 3 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] ∼ U [$0.5, $4−∆σ] ∼ U [$0.5, $3.5]
7 4 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] ∼ U [$0.5, $4] −σε
8 4 $4 ∼ U [$1, $8] ∼ U [$0.5, $4−∆σ] +∆σ ∼ U [$0.5, $3.5]
Note: Values for ∆µ are drawn in $1 increments. Values for σε (∆σ) are drawn in $0.50 increments.
3.3.1.3 Public Good Tasks
In eight of the public good tasks, assets are homogeneous across decision maker and
other person. The program uses the same algorithm as in the private good tasks laid
out above to construct the assets for the homogeneous tasks. In the other 15 public
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good tasks, assets are heterogeneous across decision maker and other person. Tables
3.3 and 3.4 list the asset parameters (expected payouts and standard deviations) for
the heterogeneous public good tasks.
Table 3.3: Expected Payout Parameters, Heterogeneous Group Task Lotteries
# Treat. µε1 = µ
ε
2 dµ ∆µ ∆µ1 ∆µ2
1 1 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ δdµ ∆µ+ (1− δ) dµ
2 1 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ dµ ∆µ
3 1 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ ∆µ+ dµ
4 2 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] - $0 $0
5 2 $4 - - $0 $0
6 2 $4 - - $0 $0
7 3 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ δdµ ∆µ+ (1− δ) dµ
8 3 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ dµ ∆µ
9 3 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ ∆µ+ dµ
10 4 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ δdµ ∆µ+ (1− δ) dµ
11 4 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ dµ ∆µ
12 4 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ ∆µ+ dµ
13 5 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ δdµ ∆µ+ (1− δ) dµ
14 5 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$1, $8− dµ] ∆µ+ dµ ∆µ
15 5 $4 ∼ U [$1, $7] ∼ U [$0, $8− dµ] ∆µ ∆µ+ dµ
Notes: Subscripts 1 and 2 denote decision maker and other person, respectively. δ is an indicator
function which is either 1 or 0 based on a random draw.
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Table 3.4: Standard Deviation Parameters, Heterogeneous Group Task Lotteries
# Treat. dσ ∆σ σε1 σ
ε
2 ∆σ1 ∆σ2
1 1 - - $0 $0 $0 $0
2 1 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] dσ +∆σ dσ $0 $0
3 1 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] dσ dσ +∆σ $0 $0
4 2 ∼ U [$0.5, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] (1− δ) dσ +∆σ δdσ +∆σ −σεD $0
5 2 ∼ U [$0.5, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 $4 σεD − (dσ +∆σ) ∆σ − σεR
6 2 ∼ U [$0.5, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 $4 σεD −∆σ σεR − (dσ +∆σ)
7 3 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $0 $0 (1− δ) dσ +∆σ δdσ +∆σ
8 3 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] dσ +∆σ dσ $4− σεD $4− σεR
9 3 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] dσ dσ +∆σ $4− σεD $4− σεR
10 4 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] (1− δ) dσ +∆σ δdσ +∆σ −σεD −σεR
11 4 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 $4 dσ +∆σ − σεD ∆σ − σεR
12 4 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 $4 ∆σ − σεD dσ +∆σ − σεR
13 5 ∼ U [$0.5, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] (1− δ) dσ +∆σ $0 −σεD δdσ +∆σ
14 5 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 dσ +∆σ ∆σ − σεD dσ +∆σ − σεR
15 5 ∼ U [$0, $4] ∼ U [$0, $4− dσ] $4 dσ dσ +∆σ − σεD ∆σ − σεR
Notes: Subscripts 1 and 2 denote decision maker and other person, respectively. δ is an indicator
function which is either 1 or 0 based on a random draw.
3.3.2 Hypotheses
The objective of the experimental design is to test the effect of uncertainty on the
WTA-WTP disparity for private good and public good lotteries. Based on the theo-
retical derivations in section 3.2, I lay out the following experimental hypotheses. The
first hypotheses refer to relative risk changes between assets ε and α and are stated
independently from private good and public good task. Note that these hypotheses
assume that the average individual is weakly risk averse.
Hypothesis 3.1. The decrease in the offer for a relative risk increase, ∆σ > 0, is
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greater in magnitude than the increase in the offer for an equivalent risk decrease,
∆σ < 0.
Hypothesis 3.2. The decrease in the bid for a relative risk increase, ∆σ > 0, is
greater in magnitude than the increase in the bid for an equivalent risk decrease,
∆σ < 0.
The next two hypotheses refer to absolute risk changes between assets ε and α
and are based on the assumption that the average individual’s risk preferences satisfy
DARA.
Hypothesis 3.3. The bid for a risk increase is less than or equal to the offer for an
equivalent risk decrease (σα > σε).
Hypothesis 3.4. The bid for a risk decrease is greater than or equal to the offer for
an equivalent risk increase (σα < σε).
The following two hypotheses refer to relative risk changes in asset α, again based
on the assumption that the average individual satisfies DARA.
Hypothesis 3.5. For ∆σ > 0, the bid decreases at a faster rate than the offer as ∆σ
increases.
Hypothesis 3.6. For ∆σ < 0, the bid increases at a slower rate than the offer as
|∆σ| increases.
In the homogeneous public good tasks, WTA (WTP) may change relative to the
private good tasks’ WTA (WTP) if risk preferences change due to the decision affect-
ing others. Changes in risk preferences between private and homogeneous public good
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tasks either decrease or increase the WTA-WTP disparity if individuals respectively
behave more risk neutral or more risk averse in the homogeneous public good tasks. In
the heterogeneous public goods tasks, social efficiency suggests that WTA and WTP
increase in the other person’s expected payout. Recall that µε1 = µ
ε
2, thus fairness
preferences predict a decrease in WTA and WTP for positive and negative differences
in expected payouts between decision maker and other individual, µα1 6= µα2 . Maximin




The data was collected in ten experimental sessions at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville in the Summer semester in 2013. A total of 168 undergraduate student
subjects participated in the sessions. Each subject participated in one session only
and participated in either a WTP or a WTA session. Each session consisted of 37
total decision rounds. Sessions lasted between one hour 30 minutes and one hour 45
minutes. On average, subjects earned $19.40 ($35.90) in the WTP (WTA) sessions.
Differences in average earnings between the WTP and WTA sessions are the result
of the inherent differences in property rights in the decision tasks.
To avoid potential experimental confounds, the experimental procedures followed
the design choices of Plott and Zeiler (2005) closely. A monitor read the experimental
instructions and explained how the computer program works to participants. The
instructions described the optimal strategy in the BDM mechanism. Prior to the
actual paid decision rounds, participants filled out a short paid quiz which tested
them on their understanding of the buying (selling) mechanism. The monitor then
individually checked participants’ answers and thoroughly answered any questions
that participants may have had to avoid any potential misconceptions. Further, the
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monitor went over the answers to the quiz questions with the whole group.
In each session, all subjects participated in three groups of paid decision tasks:
(1) low stakes, individual buying (selling) tasks with certain payouts (six decision
tasks), (2) high stakes, private buying (selling) tasks with uncertain payouts (eight
decision tasks), (3) high stakes, group buying (selling) tasks with uncertain payouts
(23 decision tasks). Subjects always participated in the low stakes, individual task
block first. The second task block was either the individual high stakes block or
the group high stakes block7. In between each task block, participants received a
new set of instructions that described the next block. At the beginning of each
block, participants first went trough one unpaid practice round so that they could
familiarize themselves with the decision task. All six low stakes decision tasks were
paid tasks and were resolved at the end of each task by the computer program.
The low paid decision tasks served as training rounds that provided subjects with
sufficient hands-on experience with the buying (selling) mechanism to eliminate any
subject misconceptions.
In both high stakes task blocks, participants did not know how many decision
tasks they would go through until the end of a decision task block. At the end of the
session, the computer randomly selected at least one of the private good tasks and at
least two of the public good tasks for actual payment (in at least one of these tasks,
the participant was the decision maker, and in at least one of these tasks, the matched
person was the decision maker). High stakes decisions were not resolved at the end of a
decision round. Instead, the monitor informed participants about the random decision
selection mechanism. Participants did not know how many high stakes decisions they
7I varied the order of the private and public good tasks within each session to control for potential
order effects. Further, within each task block, I shuffled the order of specific tasks (treatments).
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would make. The monitor pointed out that each decision task could be selected as one
of the tasks that will determine subjects’ earnings. In total, four (three) high stakes
decision rounds were chosen for payment in each of the WTP (WTA) sessions. Karni
and Safra (1987) demonstrate that the BDM elicitation mechanism may not always be
incentive compatible; further, Holt (1986) points out that random decision selection
(RDS) mechanism may not be incentive compatible under certain conditions (lotteries
over lotteries argument). However, recent theoretical work (Azrieli et al. (2012a,b))
demonstrates that the RDS mechanism is incentive compatible if subjects’ “ranking
of gambles over outcomes respects the monotonicity axiom.”
Participants made decisions on a fully-automated computer program in laboratory
with networked computer workstations. In each buying (selling) decision, participants
had to enter an bid (offer) amount into the computer. The computer program dis-
played initial asset and the alternative asset. The computer screen explained the
stakes of an asset in words and also showed a graphical representation of the asset
(Figure C.1, Figure C.2, and Figure C.3 show screenshots of the low stakes, individ-
ual high stakes, and group high stakes decision tasks in the WTP treatment. Figure
C.7, Figure C.8, and Figure C.9 show screenshots of the low stakes, individual high
stakes, and group high stakes decision tasks in the WTA treatment, respectively.).
Figures C.4 through C.12 show the corresponding screenshots of the payout stages.
I programmed all treatments in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Privacy screens on the




First, I present the results of the training tasks. Recall the optimal strategy in
the BDM mechanism is to bid (offer) the difference in values between in initial and
alternative asset. To test whether subjects bids (offers) converge to the optimal bid
(offer), I regress the difference between bid (offer) and difference in payout, b (o)−∆µ,
on experiment covariates. Table 3.5 shows the regression results. The results suggest
that offers exceed the difference in payouts. Bids are greater than the difference in
payouts but less so than the offers. Importantly, in the last training round, bids are not
significantly different from zero at the standard significance levels ( ̂b−∆µ = 0.03,
t = 1.44). Offers significantly exceed the difference in payouts in the last round
(ô−∆µ = 0.05, t = 2.75). However, the amount that offers exceed the difference in
payouts is only about $0.05. This is similar to the findings of Plott and Zeiler (2005).
I conclude that by the end of the training rounds, the majority of participants fully
understood the optimal strategy in the BDM mechanism.
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Table 3.5: Training Rounds Regression Estimates
Variable b (o)−∆µ
Round 0.0008 (0.0043)
Last Round -0.0150 (0.0247)
WTP·Last Round 0.0237 (0.0298)
WTP -0.0490*** (0.0122)
Constant 0.0634*** (0.0155)
N = 1, 008, R2 = 0.02, F = 4.27***
Note: The coefficient estimates are in dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subject level,
are in parantheses. Significance of coefficient estimates at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by
***, **, and *.
3.4.2 Private and Public Good Tasks
To test the impact of welfare changes and changes in risk between the initial and the
alternative asset on WTP (WTA), I conduct the following regression analysis which
pools all observations from the private and public goods tasks:










	 + εi, (3.4.2)
where yi is either bi or oi. 1{Treat.} denotes a (6 x 1) indicator vector for the six distinct
tasks: (1) private WTA, (2) private WTP, (3) public homogeneous WTA, (4) public
homogeneous WTP, (5) public heterogeneous WTA, and (6) public heterogeneous
WTP (e.g. 1{Treat.} = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
′ if the observation is a public heterogeneous
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WTA task). Vector β0 denotes task-specific intercepts. Vectors β⊕ and β	 denote
the coefficient vectors for relative risk increases and decreases, respectively. That is
∆σ⊕ = σα − σε ≥ 0 and ∆σ	 = σα − σε < 0. Variables δµ⊕, δµ	, δσ⊕, and δσ	
are specific to the public good heterogeneous tasks. These variables capture social
preferences with respect to relative changes in expected payouts and risk between
the decision maker and the other person. Specifically, δµ⊕ = ∆µ1 − ∆µ2 ≥ 0 and
δµ	 = ∆µ1 − ∆µ2 < 0, where subscript 1 (2) denotes the decision maker’s (other
person’s) expected difference in payout. The other two variables, δσ⊕ and δσ	, are
constructed in a similar way with respect to relative risk changes between decision
maker and other person.
Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 predict a negative relationship between WTA (WTP) and
∆σ⊕ and a positive relationship between WTA (WTP) and ∆σ	. Further, I expect
the increase in WTA (WTP) as ∆σ	 increases to be smaller than the decrease in
WTA (WTP) as ∆σ⊕ increases. According to hypothesis 3.5, the decrease in WTA
should be less than the decrease in WTP as ∆σ⊕ increases. Similarly, the increase in
WTP should be greater than the increase in WTA as ∆σ	 increases (3.6).
Social efficiency predicts that WTA and WTP decrease in δµ⊕ and increase in δµ	.
Fairness predicts that both welfare measures decrease in δµ⊕ and δµ	. If individuals
are concerned about the risk exposure of others, then there should be a negative
(positive) relationship between the welfare measures and δσ⊕ (δσ	).
Table 3.6 reports the regression results with coefficient estimates for WTA and
WTP across columns. The last column shows the differences in coefficient estimates
between WTA and WTP. Note that an offer of $12 (a bid of $0) is equivalent to no sell
(no buy) intentions. The regression only includes offers (bids) strictly less (greater)
than $12 ($0). Table C.1 in the Appendix shows the regression estimates based on
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the full sample.8 First, I discuss the coefficient estimates for the private good tasks.
The intercept estimates for WTA and WTP are both significantly positive at the 1%
significance level which indicates over-offering (over-bidding). The WTA intercept
estimate exceeds the WTP intercept estimate by $0.54, the difference is statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level. The coefficient estimate on ∆σ⊕ for WTA is
positive, although not significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimate on
∆σ⊕ for WTP is significantly negative (5% signifcance level) which indicates risk-
aversion for risk increases. For each dollar that the standard deviation of asset α
exceeds the standard deviation of asset ε, the bid decreases by $0.21. The difference
in coefficient estimates between WTA and WTP is positive but not significant (no
support for hypothesis 3.5). The coefficient estimate on ∆σ	 is significantly positive
for both welfare measures (at the 1% significance level) which suggests risk aversion
for risk reductions. For each dollar that the standard deviation of asset ε exceeds the
standard deviation of asset α, the estimated offer (bid) decreases by $0.72 ($0.44).
The difference in coefficient estimates between WTA and WTP is significantly positive
at the 5% level (t-test) which supports hypothesis 3.6. Next, I test for differences
in coefficient estimates for risk changes within a welfare measure.Within WTA, the
coefficient estimate on ∆µ⊕ is significantly less in magnitude than the coefficient
estimate on ∆µ	 (t-test with p-value <0.01) which contradicts hypothesis 3.1. Within
WTP, the coefficient estimate on ∆µ⊕ is significantly less in magnitude than the
coefficient estimate on ∆µ	 (t-test with p-value 0.06) which contradicts hypothesis
3.2. To test hypothesis 3.4, I look at the following scenario. Set ∆µ = $0, ∆σ	 = $4
(i.e. σε = $4, σα = $0 and µε = µα which is the largest possible, pure risk reduction
8Estimates do not differ much qualitatively across the two samples. However, the difference in
intercept coefficient estimates between WTA and WTP is greater in the full sample regression than
in the restricted sample regression.
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in WTP in the experiment); the estimated offer, ô = $3.88, is significantly greater
than the estimated bid, b̂ = $2.23 (t-test with p-value <0.01). That is, even under a
scenario that most likely yields a negative WTA-WTP disparity, the findings suggest
a positive disparity. I do not find support for hypothesis 3.4. In general, the findings
suggest that WTA is significantly greater than WTP for lotteries. I summarize the
findings from the private good tasks as follows.
Result 3.1. The increase in WTA for a relative risk decrease in α, ∆σ < 0, is greater
in magnitude than the decrease in WTA for an equivalent relative risk increase.
Result 3.2. The increase in WTP for a relative risk decrease in α, ∆σ < 0, is greater
than the decrease in WTP for an equivalent relative risk decrease.
Result 3.3. WTA is greater than WTP for ∆σ > 0.
Result 3.4. WTA is greater than WTP for ∆σ < 0.
Result 3.5. For ∆ > 0, WTP does not decrease at a different rate than WTA as ∆σ
increases.
Result 3.6. For ∆ < 0, WTP increases at a slower rate than WTA as |∆σ| increases.
Note that the only difference between the private good and homogeneous public
good tasks is that for the latter the decision affects another person who has the same
proposed welfare and risk change as the decision maker. Comparing coefficient esti-
mates between private good and homogeneous public good tasks yields the following
findings. The difference in coefficient estimates on ∆σ⊕ is significantly positive at
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the 10% significance level. This is mainly driven by the significance of the WTP
coefficient estimate - the WTA coefficient estimate is still not significantly different
from zero. Analogous to the private good tasks, there is a significantly positive dis-
parity between coefficient estimates on ∆σ	. Together this is evidence in support of
hypotheses 3.5 and 3.6. Within WTA, the coefficient on ∆σ⊕ is significantly less in
magnitude than the coefficient on ∆σ	 (t-test with p-value of <0.01) which contra-
dicts hypothesis 3.1. Within WTP, the coefficient on ∆σ⊕ is less in magnitude than
the coefficient on ∆σ	, however the difference is not statistically significant (t-test
with p-value of 0.65) (not hypothesis 3.2). Corresponding coefficient estimates on
risk changes within a welfare measure do not differ significantly across private good
and homogeneous public good tasks. This indicates that individuals’ risk preferences
when their decisions affect others are not different from their risk preferences when
they make individual decisions.
The heterogeneous public good tasks differ from the homogeneous public good
task in that the assets are different across decision maker and other person in terms
relative expected payouts and relative risk changes. The intercept estimates for WTA
and WTP are significantly greater than the corresponding estimates in the private
good tasks (t-tests with p-values of <0.01 and 0.02). The WTA coefficient estimate
on ∆σ⊕ is significantly negative (1% signifcance level) which indicates risk-aversion.
For each dollar that the standard deviation of asset α exceeds the standard deviation
of asset ε, WTA decreases by $0.42. The WTP coefficient on ∆σ⊕ is negative but
not significant. The difference in coefficient estimates between WTA and WTP is
significantly negative at the 5% significance level (contradicts hypothesis 3.5). The
finding in terms of the WTA coefficient estimate on ∆σ	 is smaller in magnitude than
in the public good homogeneous task (t-tests with p-values of <0.01). The WTP
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coefficient on ∆σ	 is smaller in magnitude than in the public good homogeneous
task yet the difference is not signifcant (t-test with p-value of 0.30). The WTA
coefficient is significantly greater than the WTP coefficient estimate (t-test with p-
value of 0.05) which supports hypothesis 3.6. Within WTA, the coefficient on ∆σ⊕
is not significantly different in magnitude from the coefficient on ∆σ	 (t-test with
p-value of 0.80). Within WTP, the absolute value of the coefficient on ∆σ⊕ is not
significantly different in magitude than from the coefficient on ∆σ	 (t-test with p-
value of 0.34).
In terms of social preferences, the coefficient estimates on δµ⊕ are significantly
negative (1% significance level) which suggest that subjects display altruism when
their own gain in expected payout exceeds the other person’s expected gain. For
each dollar that the decision maker’s expected payout gain exceeds the other person’s
expected payout gain, the decision maker decreases her offer (bid) by a $0.42 ($0.41).
The coefficient estimate on δµ	 is significantly positive at the 1% significance level
for both welfare measures. For each dollar that the decision maker’s expected payout
gain falls short of the other person’s expected payout gain, she increases her offer
(bid) by a $0.23 ($0.17). Nonetheless, there is no significant disparity across welfare
measures in terms of altruism. Fairness predicts that the coefficients estimates on
δµ	 and δµ⊕ are negative for both WTA and WTP. Clearly, this is not the case here.
However, there is a significant asymmetry between coefficient estimates on δµ⊕ and
δµ	 within both welfare measures. The estimates on δµ⊕ are significantly greater in
magnitude than the coefficient estimates on δµ	 (t-tests with p-values of 0.03 and
<0.01). This asymmetry is in line with the predictions of quasi-maximin preferences.
Result 3.7. WTA and WTP decreases (increases) when the individual’s expected
payout gain is more (less) than the other person’s expected payout gain.
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The coefficient estimates on changes in relative risk indicate some evidence of the
presence of social preferences with respect to changes in risk. The WTA coefficient
estimate on δσ⊕ is significantly positive at the 1% significance level. For each dollar
that the other person’s relative risk is less than the decision maker’s relative risk, the
individual is offering an additional $0.34. The corresponding WTP coefficient estimate
is positive but not significant. The difference in coefficient estimates is significantly
positive across welfare measures (t-test with p-value of 0.05).The coefficient estimates
on δσ	, on the other hand, are not significantly different from zero.
Result 3.8. WTA increases when the individual’s proposed relative risk change is
greater than the other person’s proposed risk improvement.
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Table 3.6: Public Good Regression Estimates





Intercept 1.00*** (0.19) 0.46*** (0.17) 0.54** (0.26)
∆σ⊕ 0.02 (0.13) -0.21** (0.09) 0.23 (0.16)












c Intercept 1.20*** (0.24) 0.52** (0.21) 0.68** (0.32)
∆σ⊕ -0.04 (0.12) -0.30*** (0.09) 0.26* (0.15)














Intercept 2.11*** (0.25) 1.04*** (0.27) 1.07*** (0.37)
∆σ⊕ -0.42*** (0.09) -0.12 (0.08) -0.30** (0.13)
∆σ	 0.45*** (0.07) 0.25*** (0.08) 0.21** (0.10)
δµ⊕ -0.42*** (0.05) -0.41*** (0.04) -0.02 (0.07)
δµ	 0.23*** (0.05) 0.17*** (0.04) 0.06 (0.06)
δσ⊕ 0.34*** (0.08) 0.12 (0.08) 0.23* (0.12)
δσ	 0.02 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) -0.07 (0.09)
N = 4, 747, R2 = 0.37, F = 49.10***
Note: Coefficients estimates based on pooled model. N = 4, 747 ($0 bids and $12 offers excluded
from estimation). WTA and WTP specific parameters are shown across columns for comparison.
All coefficient estimates are in dollars. Robust standard errors, clustered at the subject level (168
subjects), are in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is denoted by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I studied the impact of uncertainty on the disparity between WTA
and WTP measures for private and public good lotteries. This study differs from
previous work in that it provides a rigorous experimental investigation of the effect of
uncertainty on the disparity. Importantly, the decision tasks includes scenarios where
a proposed policy change decreases (increases) risk in WTP (WTA). Previous work
has not addressed uncertainty in a public good setting although public policies that
target risk reductions in the context of health and the environment inherently involve
uncertainty.
Using incentive compatible elicitation, I showed that the disparity persists for
both private good and public good lotteries in the lab. I also found a large inherent
disparity that cannot be explained by the experimental parameters in the econometric
specification. The econometric specification assumes that the relationship between
WTA (WTP) and changes in risk is linear. However, risk aversion suggests non-
linearities. An extended model that allows for non-linearities may be able to explain
some of the disparity. Further, I can use the private good tasks to construct a measure
of risk aversion for each subject which allows for a more rigorous analysis of the
public good tasks. Nonetheless, the observed disparity indicates the presence of an
endowment effect. Previous empirical work showed that market experience plays
an important role in minimizing the endowment effect (List, 2003). In terms of the
experiment, it is possible that subjects in the WTA condition were not as experienced
with the selling task as subjects were with the buying task in the WTP condition.
One important extension of the analysis is to explore whether subjects’ demographic
characteristics and personality traits can explain part of the WTA-WTP disparity. I
102
collected this information in post-experiment surveys.
The empirical results from the heterogeneous public good tasks provide evidence
of social efficiency preferences. Participants care about changes in others’ expected
payouts. In terms of changes in expected payout relative to others, I found that par-
ticipants are more altruistic when they are relatively worse off compared to when they
are better off. This finding confirms previous results in the absence of unccertainty
(Messer et al., 2010). Importantly, the experiments also showed that individuals have
social preferences with regards to changes in risk. I observed social risk preferences in
the context of relative risk increases in WTA. As mentioned before, the private good
tasks can be used to investigate how individuals’ private risk preferences affect their
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The Impact of Forward Trading on
Tacit Collusion
A.1 Termination Rule
I count each market as a single observation to account for possible interdependence of
observations within a single market. The average chosen strategy in the known-end
C2 treatment is lower (1.74) than the average strategy in the unknown-end treatment
(2.08). This difference is not significant (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −1.04, p =
0.30). There is no observable difference in average chosen strategies between the two
different termination rules in the C3 treatment (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −0.17,
p = 0.87).
Next, I test for changes in subjects’ decisions at the end of the game by comparing
chosen strategies in a short period at the end of the game to chosen strategies in 10
prior rounds. Specifically, in the known- (unknown-) end termination treatments, I
compare the average chosen strategies in a market in rounds 14-23 (16-25) to the
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average strategies in rounds 24-25 (26-27), respectively. Counting each market as a
single observation, I find no statistically significant difference in the distribution of
chosen strategies between the unknown-end C2 treatment, the known- and unknown-
end C3 treatments, and the FS2 treatment (matched-pairs Wilcoxon signed-rank
test with p-values ranging from 0.21 - 0.97). Although not significant, note that
average chosen strategies are lower in the last two rounds in both C3 termination rule
treatments. In the known-end C2 treatment, however, the average chosen strategy is
significantly greater in the last two rounds compared to the 10 rounds prior (matched
pairs Wilcoxon, z = −2.86, p = 0.004). Comparing average chosen strategies in
rounds 15-24 (17-26) to average strategies in the final round yields similar results.
Average chosen strategies in the known-end C2 treatment are lower than average
strategies in the unknown-end C2 treatment. I test whether average chosen strategies
in round 24 of the known-end C2 treatment differ from average strategies in rounds
18-27 in the unknown-end C2 treatment: I find no significant difference in average
chosen strategies (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = −0.56, p = 0.58). Based on these
results, I drop the final round from the known-end C2 data and pool unknown- and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































1 5 9 13 17 21 25
Round
Market 24
Note: Markets 1-12 (13-24) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.























































































































































































































































































































































































































1 5 9 13 17 21 25
Round
Market 48
Note: Markets 25-36 (37-48) in Summer (Spring) session.















































































































































































































































































1 5 9 13 17 21 25
Round
Market 64
Note: Markets 49-59 (60-64) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
















































































































































































































































































































































Zero Coll.Cour. Def. Pun.
Market 24
Note: Markets 1-12 (13-24) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
















































































































































































































































































































































Zero Coll.Cour. Def. Pun.
Market 48
Note: Markets 25-36 (37-48) in Summer (Spring) session.
































































































































































































































Zero Coll. Cour. Def.
Market 64
Note: Markets 49-59 (60-64) in unknown- (known-) end termination rule treatment.
Figure A.6: Proportion of Strategies with 95% Conf. Int., C3 Treatment, All Markets
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A.3 Instructions
A.3.1 Single Phase Treatment
Brackets, [], denote differences between two-firm and three-firm instructions.
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. If you
follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At
the end of today’s session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
Overview
The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number of
rounds until the end of the experiment. At the beginning of the session, you will be
randomly and anonymously matched with one [two] other person[s]. The one [two]
other person[s] with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round, but
you will not learn the identity of the other person[s]. The decisions that you and the
other [two] person[s] make will determine the dollar earnings for each of you.
In this session, you are a quantity-setting seller of a hypothetical good. You will earn
profits by selling units of the good. At the beginning of each round, you will be asked
how many units of the good you want to sell in that round. You make a decision
by selecting a number from a list on your computer. The possible choices are 0, 30,
40, 45, or 60 [0, 20, 30, or 40] units. At the same time that you are submitting how
many units you want to sell, the other [two] seller[s] in your 2[3]-seller market will
also submit how many units he/she [they] wants to sell. None of you will be able to
see the decisions of the other [two] seller[s] in your market until both [all three] of you
have submitted your decisions. Note that once submitted, all decisions are final and
cannot be changed. At the end of each round, you will see how many units you sold,
how many units the other seller[s] in your 2[3]-seller market sold, how many total
123
units were sold, the price for that round, and your earnings for that round. Earnings
are denoted in tokens and each unit has a cost of 0 (zero) tokens to you.
Price Calculation
Buyers are automated by the computer program. The market price at the end of a
round will be determined by the units sold by both [all three] sellers in your 2[3]-seller
market in a round. At the end of a round, the computer will calculate the market
price (in tokens) as follows:
Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage
In general, the higher the number of total units sold the lower the price and vice
versa. If the total amount of units sold across both stages is greater than or equal to
120, the price will be zero. Hint: The number of total sales in your 2[3]-seller market
can never be greater than 120 in any round.
Earnings
You will earn profits by selling units. The profit for any unit sold is the selling price
in that round. Your total earnings (in tokens) in a round will be calculated as follows:
Round Earnings = Price · Your Total Units Sold
Your total earnings in this part of the experiment will be your total earnings from all
rounds. At the end of the first experiment, tokens will be converted into U.S. dollars
at a rate of 1,800 tokens per U.S. dollar.
The following table shows your possible earnings in each round based on the sales
choices that you and the other seller in your 2[3]-seller market make:
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ld 0 30 40 45 60
0 0 0 0 0 0
30 2,700 1,800 1,500 1,350 900
40 3,200 2,000 1,600 1,400 800
45 3,375 2,025 1,575 1,350 675
60 3,600 1,800 1,200 900 0











ld 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 2,000 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400
30 2,700 2,100 1,800 1,500 1,200 900 600 300
40 3,200 2,400 2,000 1,600 1,200 800 400 0
Before making any final decisions, you will be asked to answer 4 (four) practice
questions to verify that you understand how your earnings are determined.
Computer Program
At the top of your screen, you will see a payout table similar to the table above (gray
frame). In the middle of your screen, you will see the actual decision panel (orange
frame). You will make a decision by selecting how many units you want to sell from
the list. Once you click the “Submit” button, your sales decision cannot be changed
and will be final. At the end of each round, the computer will display your sales, the
other [two] seller’s sales, the total sales in your 3-seller market, the price, and your
profit for that round. The computer will keep track of your sales, the other seller’s
sales, the price, and your earnings in each round. This information will be displayed
in a table at the bottom of your computer screen (gray frame). The computer will




• The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number
of rounds until the end of the experiment.
• You will be randomly matched with one [two] other seller[s]. The one [two]
other seller[s] with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round!
• You will earn profits by selling units. The profit for any unit sold is the selling
price in that round.
• The price that you will receive for each unit you sell in a round is calculated as
follows: Price = 120− Total Units Sold
• Your earnings will be the sum of your earnings from all rounds.
If you have a question at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand!
One of the monitors will come to your station and answer it in private.
A.3.2 Two-Phase Treatment
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. If you
follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At
the end of today’s session, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
Overview
The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number of
rounds until the end of the experiment. At the beginning of the session, you will be
randomly and anonymously matched with one other person. The one other person
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with whom you will be matched will be the same in every round, but you will not
learn the identity of the other person. The decisions that you and the other person
make will determine the dollar earnings for each of you.
In this session, you are a quantity-setting seller of a hypothetical good. You will earn
profits by selling units of the good. Each round consists of two stages (A and B).
At the beginning of each stage, you will be asked how many units of the good you
want to sell in that stage. You make a decision by selecting a number from a list on
your computer. (In stage A, the possible choices are 0 and 24 units. In stage B, you
will have five choices which depend on the decisions in stage A.) At the same time
that you are submitting how many units you want to sell, the other seller in your
2-seller market will also submit how many units he/she wants to sell. None of you
will be able to see the decisions of the other seller in your market until both of you
have submitted your decisions. Note that once submitted, all decisions are final and
cannot be changed.
At the end of stage A, you will see how many units you sold, how many units the
other seller in your 2-seller market sold and how many units were sold in total in
Stage A. At the end of stage B, you will see how many units you sold, how many
units the other seller in your 2-seller market sold, the price for that round, and your
earnings for that round. Earnings are denoted in tokens and each unit has a cost of
0 (zero) tokens to you.
Price Calculation
Buyers are automated by the computer program. The market price at the end of a
round will be determined by the units sold by both sellers in your 2-seller market in
a round in stage A and stage B combined. At the end of a round, the computer will
calculate the market price (in tokens) as follows:
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Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage A− Total Units Sold Stage B
In general, the higher the number of total units sold the lower the price and vice
versa. If the total amount of units sold across both stages is greater than or equal to
120, the price will be zero. Hint: The number of total sales in your 2-seller market
can never be greater than 120 in any round.
Earnings
You will earn profits by selling units. The profit for any unit sold is the selling price
in that round. Your total earnings (in tokens) in a round will be calculated as follows:
Round Earnings = Price · Your Total Units Sold
Note: You will receive the same price for any unit sold in stage A and/or stage B.
Your total earnings in the experiment will be your total earnings from all rounds. At
the end of the first experiment, tokens will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of
1,800 tokens per U.S. dollar.
Attached is a table that shows your possible earnings in each round based on the sales
choices that you and the other seller in your 2-seller market make in both stages.
Before making any final decisions, you will be asked to answer 4 (four) practice
questions to verify that you understand how your earnings are determined.
Computer Program
At the top of your screen, you will see a payoff table similar to the table above (gray
frame). In the middle of your screen, you will see the actual decision panel (orange
frame). You will make a decision by selecting how many units you want to sell from
the list. Once you click the “Submit” button, your sales decision cannot be changed
and will be final.
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At the end of each round, the computer will display your sales, the other seller’s sales,
the total sales in your 2-seller market, the price, and your earnings for that round.
The computer will keep track of your sales, the price, and your earnings in each
round. This information will be displayed in a table at the bottom of your computer
screen (gray frame). The computer will also update your total earnings which will be
displayed at the top of your screen (in tokens).
Summary
• The experiment will last several decision rounds. You will not know the number
of rounds until the end of the experiment.
• You will be randomly matched with one other seller. The one other seller with
whom you will be matched will be the same in every round!
• You will earn profits by selling units in either stage A, or stage B, or both stages.
The profit for any unit sold is the selling price in that round.
• The price that you will receive for each unit you sell in a round is calculated as
follows: Price = 120− Total Units Sold Stage A− Total Units Sold Stage B
• Your earnings will be the sum of your earnings from all rounds.
If you have a question at any point during the experiment, please raise your hand!






















0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0
0 0 0 30 30 90 0 2,700
0 0 0 40 40 80 0 3,200
0 0 0 45 45 75 0 3,375
0 0 0 60 60 60 0 3,600
0 0 30 0 30 90 2,700 0
0 0 30 30 60 60 1,800 1,800
0 0 30 40 70 50 1,500 2000
0 0 30 45 75 45 1,350 2025
0 0 30 60 90 30 900 1800
0 0 40 0 40 80 3,200 0
0 0 40 30 70 50 2,000 1,500
0 0 40 40 80 40 1,600 1,600
0 0 40 45 85 35 1,400 1,575
0 0 40 60 100 20 800 1,200
0 0 45 0 45 75 3,375 0
0 0 45 30 75 45 2,025 1,350
0 0 45 40 85 35 1,575 1,400
0 0 45 45 90 30 1,350 1,350
0 0 45 60 105 15 675 900
0 0 60 0 60 60 3,600 0
0 0 60 30 90 30 1,800 900
0 0 60 40 100 20 1,200 800
0 0 60 45 105 15 900 675
0 0 60 60 120 0 0 0






















0 24 0 0 24 96 0 2,304
0 24 0 6 30 90 0 2,700
0 24 0 32 56 64 0 3,584
0 24 0 33 57 63 0 3,591
0 24 0 48 72 48 0 3,456
0 24 30 0 54 66 1,980 1,584
0 24 30 6 60 60 1,800 1,800
0 24 30 32 86 34 1,020 1,904
0 24 30 33 87 33 990 1,881
0 24 30 48 102 18 540 1,296
0 24 32 0 56 64 2,048 1,536
0 24 32 6 62 58 1,856 1,740
0 24 32 32 88 32 1,024 1,792
0 24 32 33 89 31 992 1,767
0 24 32 48 104 16 512 1,152
0 24 45 0 69 51 2,295 1,224
0 24 45 6 75 45 2,025 1,350
0 24 45 32 101 19 855 1,064
0 24 45 33 102 18 810 1,026
0 24 45 48 117 3 135 216
0 24 48 0 72 48 2,304 1,152
0 24 48 6 78 42 2,016 1,260
0 24 48 32 104 16 768 896
0 24 48 33 105 15 720 855
0 24 48 48 120 0 0 0






















24 0 0 0 24 96 2,304 0
24 0 0 30 54 66 1,584 1,980
24 0 0 32 56 64 1,536 2,048
24 0 0 45 69 51 1,224 2,295
24 0 0 48 72 48 1,152 2,304
24 0 6 0 30 90 2,700 0
24 0 6 30 60 60 1,800 1,800
24 0 6 32 62 58 1,740 1,856
24 0 6 45 75 45 1,350 2,025
24 0 6 48 78 42 1,260 2,016
24 0 32 0 56 64 3,584 0
24 0 32 30 86 34 1,904 1,020
24 0 32 32 88 32 1,792 1,024
24 0 32 45 101 19 1,064 855
24 0 32 48 104 16 896 768
24 0 33 0 57 63 3,591 0
24 0 33 30 87 33 1,881 990
24 0 33 32 89 31 1,767 992
24 0 33 45 102 18 1,026 810
24 0 33 48 105 15 855 720
24 0 48 0 72 48 3,456 0
24 0 48 30 102 18 1,296 540
24 0 48 32 104 16 1,152 512
24 0 48 45 117 3 216 135
24 0 48 48 120 0 0 0






















24 24 0 0 48 72 1,728 1,728
24 24 6 0 54 66 1,980 1,584
24 24 24 0 72 48 2,304 1,152
24 24 33 0 81 39 2,223 936
24 24 36 0 84 36 2,160 864
24 24 0 6 54 66 1,584 1,980
24 24 6 6 60 60 1,800 1,800
24 24 24 6 78 42 2,016 1,260
24 24 33 6 87 33 1,881 990
24 24 36 6 90 30 1,800 900
24 24 0 24 72 48 1,152 2,304
24 24 6 24 78 42 1,260 2,016
24 24 24 24 96 24 1,152 1,152
24 24 33 24 105 15 855 720
24 24 36 24 108 12 720 576
24 24 0 33 81 39 936 2,223
24 24 6 33 87 33 990 1,881
24 24 24 33 105 15 720 855
24 24 33 33 114 6 342 342
24 24 36 33 117 3 180 171
24 24 0 36 84 36 864 2,160
24 24 6 36 90 30 900 1,800
24 24 24 36 108 12 576 720
24 24 33 36 117 3 171 180
24 24 36 36 120 0 0 0
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A.4 Screen Shots
Figure A.7: Decision Stage A, FS2 Treatment






B.1.1 S&P 500 Market-Portfolio Estimates
The following tables show the regression estimates based on the S&P 500 index as
market-portfolio. The results are very similar to those based on the CRSP value-
weighted index.
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Table B.1: Iceland Volcano Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.01 (0.01)
Banks and Insurance - 0.06* (0.03) 0.94* (0.51)
Basic Materials - 0.11** (0.04) -2.81*** (0.75)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.05* (0.02) 1.87*** (0.49)
Financial Services - 0.12** (0.05) -1.44** (0.64)
Food & Beverage - -0.06 (0.07) -0.57* (0.34)
General Industrials - -0.03% (0.03) 2.12*** (0.65)
Health Care - -0.06** (0.03) -0.74 (0.50)
Industrial Goods - 0.03** (0.02) 0.52 (0.40)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.02 (0.04) -0.46 (0.80)
Oil and Gas - 0.04 (0.07) 0.45 (0.48)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.06 (0.07) -3.50*** (0.78)
Retail - 0.02 (0.05) 0.35 (0.43)
Technology - -0.03 (0.02) 0.44 (0.44)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.06** (0.03) 1.88*** (0.61)
Utilities - -0.01 (0.02) <0.01 (0.33)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.11 (0.20) -0.10 (0.20) -
ln (Sales) 0.01 (0.21) 0.06 (0.21) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.2: Deepwater Horizon Explosion Estimates, 3-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR3d CAR3d Mean ĈAR3d
Industry Fixed-Effect Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.01** (<0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - -0.04 (0.03) -1.10** (0.43)
Basic Materials - -0.05* (0.03) 1.84*** (0.48)
Consumer Products, Cars - <0.01 (0.01) 0.88* (0.46)
Financial Services - -0.07** (0.03) 0.32 (0.59)
Food & Beverage - 0.05 (0.04) -1.48*** (0.25)
General Industrials - 0.01 (0.01) 0.88* (0.49)
Health Care - -0.03 (0.03) -0.65 (0.45)
Industrial Goods - -0.02* (0.01) 0.79** (0.37)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.02 (0.03) 1.69** (0.68)
Oil and Gas - -0.04 (0.05) 2.36*** (0.36)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 (0.48)
Retail - 0.08** (0.04) -0.47 (0.32)
Technology - -0.03* (0.02) 0.14 (0.27)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.06** (0.02) -0.41 (0.27)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.02) 0.31 (0.28)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.27* (0.16) -0.36** (0.17) -
ln (Sales) <0.01 (0.14) 0.09 (0.15) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.3: Responsibility Disclosure Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.03** (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.14** (0.06) 5.98*** (0.67)
Basic Materials - 0.02 (0.04) 3.03*** (1.08)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.04* (0.02) -1.46** (0.63)
Financial Services - -0.10* (0.06) 2.59*** (0.82)
Food & Beverage - -0.03 (0.13) -0.27 (0.60)
General Industrials - -0.03 (0.03) -1.13 (0.93)
Health Care - -0.02 (0.04) -2.66*** (0.55)
Industrial Goods - -0.05 (0.03) -0.59 (0.63)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.04 (0.03) -0.71 (0.61)
Oil and Gas - -0.04 (0.09) 1.69** (0.69)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.03 (0.04) 0.11 (0.75)
Retail - -0.03 (0.04) -1.42*** (0.42)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) -2.01*** (0.43)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.02 (0.04) -0.34 (0.48)
Utilities - -0.04 (0.03) 1.02** (0.47)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.20 (0.25) 0.23 (0.26) -
ln (Sales) <0.02 (0.24) 0.01 (0.26) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.4: Oil-Spill Landfall Estimates, 9-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR9d CAR9d Mean ĈAR9d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.02 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.04) -0.93* (0.51)
Basic Materials - -0.04 (0.03) -0.14 (0.63)
Consumer Products, Cars - 0.05* (0.03) -2.16*** (0.81)
Financial Services - 0.05 (0.04) -0.97* (0.56)
Food & Beverage - -0.16 (0.15) 1.92*** (0.56)
General Industrials - <0.01 (0.03) -0.71 (0.77)
Health Care - 0.11*** (0.03) -0.71 (0.53)
Industrial Goods - -0.03 (0.02) -1.26** (0.50)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.02 (0.02) -0.89 (0.68)
Oil and Gas - 0.20 (0.15) 2.73** (1.23)
Pharmaceuticals - -0.05 (0.08) 0.33 (0.83)
Retail - 0.17*** (0.06) -2.08*** (0.57)
Technology - 0.04 (0.04) -0.77 (0.56)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.04 (0.04) -2.34*** (0.55)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.03) 1.07*** (0.37)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.72*** (0.26) 0.67*** (0.26) -
ln (Sales) -0.70*** (0.26) -0.64** (0.26) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.5: Hurricane Irene Estimates, 5-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR5d CAR5d Mean ĈAR5d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance <0.01 0.01 -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.03) 0.59 (1.02)
Basic Materials - -0.01 (0.02) 1.04*** (0.31)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.01 (0.02) 0.41 (0.42)
Financial Services - <0.01 (0.02) -0.88* (0.53)
Food & Beverage - 0.08 (0.08) 0.65 (0.43)
General Industrials - -0.01 (0.02) 0.14 (0.53)
Health Care - 0.03 (0.02) 0.24 (0.36)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.02) 0.23 (0.43)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.01 (0.02) 1.10** (0.46)
Oil and Gas - <0.01 (0.02) 1.64*** (0.38)
Pharmaceuticals - -0.01 (0.02) 0.99*** (0.32)
Retail - -0.04 (0.03) -0.10 (0.46)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.39)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.03*** (0.01) -0.75** (0.34)
Utilities - -0.04** (0.01) 1.16*** (0.27)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.28 0.19 -0.31 (0.20) -
ln (Sales) -0.04 0.22 -0.04 (0.23) -




Notes: Coefficient estimates are in percentage. The second column in specification 2 shows esti-
mated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses.
Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: BEC, BDK, BKC, CAL, DTV,
EKDKQ, ETN, FO, GENZ, HEW.Z, KFT, LSTZA, MI., Q, RGC, SII, and THC.
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B.1.2 Half-Year Estimation Window Results
Table B.6: Iceland Volcano Estimates, 6-Day Event Window\
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.05* (0.03) 1.17** (0.48)
Basic Materials - 0.11** (0.05) -2.63*** (0.79)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.05** (0.02) 2.05*** (0.50)
Financial Services - 0.12** (0.05) -1.39** (0.63)
Food & Beverage - -0.04 (0.07) -0.52 (0.34)
General Industrials - -0.04 (0.03) 2.35*** (0.59)
Health Care - -0.07** (0.03) -0.75 (0.54)
Industrial Goods - 0.04** (0.02) 0.61 (0.43)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.03 (0.05) -0.40 (0.80)
Oil and Gas - 0.06 (0.07) 0.69 (0.49)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.05 (0.07) -3.47*** (0.82)
Retail - 0.02 (0.05) 0.30 (0.41)
Technology - -0.03 (0.02) 0.55 (0.46)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.06 (0.03) 1.79*** (0.60)
Utilities - -0.01 (0.02) 0.11 (0.36)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.11 (0.21) -0.12 (0.21) -
ln (Sales) 0.02 (0.21) 0.10 (0.22) -




Notes: Estimation period is 13 October 2009 - 13 April 2010. Coefficient estimates are in percentage.
The second column shows in each specification shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the
industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.7: Deepwater Horizon Explosion Estimates, 3-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR3d CAR3d Mean ĈAR3d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - -0.06*** (0.02) -2.22*** (0.40)
Basic Materials - -0.05* (0.03) 1.68*** (0.49)
Consumer Products, Cars - 0.01 (0.01) 0.62 (0.47)
Financial Services - -0.06** (0.03) -0.50 (0.59)
Food & Beverage - 0.05 (0.05) -1.32*** (0.26)
General Industrials - <0.01 (0.01) 0.45 (0.51)
Health Care - -0.03 (0.03) -0.37 (0.46)
Industrial Goods - -0.02 (0.01) 0.46 (0.37)
Media, Travel, Leisure - 0.02 (0.03) 1.11 (0.68)
Oil and Gas - -0.03 (0.05) 2.12*** (0.34)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.02 (0.03) 0.22 (0.49)
Retail - 0.08** (0.04) -0.64** (0.31)
Technology - -0.03* (0.02) 0.27 (0.29)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.06*** (0.02) -0.73*** (0.25)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.02) 0.36 (0.28)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.25 (0.16) -0.36** (0.17) -
ln (Sales) <0.01 (0.14) 0.10 (0.15) -




Notes: Estimation period is 20 October 2009 - 20 April 2010. Coefficient estimates are in percentage.
The second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry
mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.8: Responsibility Disclosure Estimates, 6-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR6d CAR6d Mean ĈAR6d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance -0.02* (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.09*** (0.03) 2.85*** (0.52)
Basic Materials - 0.02 (0.04) 3.60*** (1.10)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.02 (0.02) -1.54** (0.66)
Financial Services - -0.06 (0.05) 0.56 (0.69)
Food & Beverage - -0.01 (0.13) 0.79 (0.62)
General Industrials - -0.04 (0.03) -1.71** (0.85)
Health Care - -0.01 (0.05) -0.81 (0.69)
Industrial Goods - -0.03 (0.03) -0.89 (0.66)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.04 (0.03) -1.72** (0.66)
Oil and Gas - 0.02 (0.11) 1.86** (0.81)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.01 (0.05) 1.47** (0.72)
Retail - -0.02 (0.05) -1.28*** (0.47)
Technology - <0.01 (0.03) -0.57*** (0.45)
Transportation, Aerospace - -0.02 (0.03) -0.58 (0.45)
Utilities - -0.04 (0.03) 1.78*** (0.42)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.16 (0.27) 0.15 (0.29) -
ln (Sales) 0.03 (0.26) 0.07 (0.28) -




Notes: Estimation period is 20 October 2009 - 20 April 2010. Coefficient estimates are in percentage.
The second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry
mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.9: Oil-Spill Landfall Estimates, 4-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR4d CAR4d Mean ĈAR4d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance 0.02** (0.01)
Banks and Insurance - -0.02 (0.02) -0.90*** (0.30)
Basic Materials - -0.02 (0.02) -1.75*** (0.47)
Consumer Products, Cars - 0.02 (0.02) -1.31*** (0.50)
Financial Services - 0.03 (0.04) -0.68 (0.45)
Food & Beverage - -0.05 (0.07) 1.05*** (0.33)
General Industrials - -0.02 (0.02) -0.42 (0.45)
Health Care - 0.12*** (0.02) 0.67* (0.39)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.01) -1.07*** (0.30)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.46)
Oil and Gas - 0.23 (0.16) 1.06 (1.01)
Pharmaceuticals - 0.04 (0.04) -0.24 (0.58)
Retail - 0.09*** (0.03) -1.39*** (0.42)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) 0.82** (0.32)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.01 (0.01) -1.73*** (0.23)
Utilities - -0.02 (0.01) -0.43** (0.21)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) 0.32* (0.19) 0.29 (0.18) -
ln (Sales) -0.19 (0.20) -0.16 (0.18) -




Notes: Estimation period is 20 October 2009 - 20 April 2010. Coefficient estimates are in percentage.
The second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the industry
mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: ACS, BRK3, BDK, BJS, BKC, DTV,
ETN, FAF, FO, GENZ, JAVA, KFT, LSTZA, PBG, PAS, SGP, WYE.
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Table B.10: Hurricane Irene Estimates, 5-Day Event Window
(1) (2)
Variable CAR5d CAR5d Mean ĈAR5d
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes -
Environmental Performance <0.01 (0.01) -
Banks and Insurance - 0.02 (0.03) 0.40 (1.04)
Basic Materials - -0.01 (0.02) 0.76** (0.31)
Consumer Products, Cars - -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.44)
Financial Services - -0.01 (0.02) -1.25** (0.54)
Food & Beverage - 0.07 (0.08) 0.19 (0.45)
General Industrials - -0.01 (0.02) 0.13 (0.56)
Health Care - 0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.37)
Industrial Goods - -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.43)
Media, Travel, Leisure - -0.01 (0.02) 0.86* (0.47)
Oil and Gas - <0.01 (0.02) 1.60*** (0.39)
Pharmaceuticals - -0.01 (0.02) 0.40 (0.33)
Retail - -0.04 (0.03) -0.45 (0.45)
Technology - 0.02 (0.02) -0.13 (0.38)
Transportation, Aerospace - 0.03*** (0.01) -1.09*** (0.36)
Utilities - -0.04** (0.01) 0.51* (0.26)
Firm-Level
ln (Mkt. Value) -0.32* (0.19) -0.35* (0.20) -
ln (Sales) 0.02 (0.22) 0.01 (0.23) -




Notes: Estimation period is 25 February 2011 - 26 August 2011. Coefficient estimates are in per-
centage. The second column in specification 2 shows estimated CARs by industry, evaluated at the
industry mean. Robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The following companies (tickers) were excluded from the regression either because of incomplete
accounting data or because of incomplete financial time series: BEC, BDK, BKC, CAL, DTV,
EKDKQ, ETN, FO, GENZ, HEW.Z, KFT, LSTZA, MI., Q, RGC, SII, and THC.
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Appendix C




The instructions below correspond with the (1) Training Tasks, (2) Private Good
High Stakes Tasks, (3) Public Good High Stakes Tasks treatment order.
C.1.1.1 Low Stakes Rounds
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. Please
follow the instructions carefully, as the amount of money you earn in the experiment
will depend on your decisions. At the end of today’s session, you will be paid your
earnings in private and in cash. Please do not communicate with other participants
during the experiment unless instructed. Importantly, please refrain from verbally
reacting to events that occur during the experiment.
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Overview
Today’s experiment will involve several buying tasks. Each task may impact your
earnings, which means that it is very important to consider each task carefully prior
to making a decision. Each task is independent from the other tasks, so the decision
you make in one task will not affect the outcome or earnings of any other task. All
money amounts are in U.S. Dollars.
There are three parts to the experiment. The first part involves low stakes buying
tasks. The second and third parts involve high stakes buying tasks. You will receive
additional instructions at the end of the first part.
Part 1: Individual Buying Task (Low Stakes)
The buying task works as follows. To start out, you own the Status Quo, which
is a “good” worth an amount of money to you. (In the example below, the Status
Quo is $0.25.) The experimenter wishes to sell an Alternative to you instead of the
Status Quo. The Alternative is a different “good” worth an amount of money. (In the
example below, the alternative is $0.60.)
Your task is to submit a bid to buy the Alternative from the experimenter.
If your bid is accepted, you will own the Alternative instead of the Status Quo. You
will pay the experimenter for buying the Alternative. Your earnings from this task
will be equal to the Alternative minus the buying price: Earnings = Alternative
– Buying Price.
If your bid is not accepted, you will keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from
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this task will be equal to the Status Quo: Earnings = Status Quo.
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you are willing
to pay to own the Alternative instead of the Status Quo and bid this amount. This
maximum amount is the price at which you feel just as well off owning the Alternative
(and paying this price) as with owning the Status Quo.
After you submit your bid, it will be compared to a randomly determined price.
Since the price is random, it is neither based on your bid nor is it related to the bids
of any other person in the room.
Here is how this random price will be used to determine whether you buy:
If your bid is greater than or the same as the random price, then you buy
the Alternative and give up the Status Quo. But here is the interesting part:
the buying price is the random price, not your bid. What this means is that
as long as you bid the maximum amount that owning the Alternative rather than the
Status Quo is worth to you, you will only buy at prices that are favorable to you and
not buy at prices unfavorable to you.
If your bid is less than the random price then you do not buy the Alternative.
Thus, you simply keep the Status Quo. Since you did not buy, you do not pay the
random price.
As you can see from the example, the Status Quo is worth money to you and so you
may be asking yourself: “Why would I want pay a price to buy the Alternative
and give up the Status Quo?” By buying, as long as it is at a favorable price to
you, you can earn more money than by simply keeping the Status Quo. Using
the example from before, let us see how:
• Suppose the random price is $0.10 and your bid is greater than $0.10. You
would own the Alternative (worth $0.60) and pay the random price of $0.10.
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Your earnings would be $0.50, which is more than simply keeping the Status
Quo ($0.25).
• Of course, you will not want to buy at just any price. Suppose the random price
is $0.50 and your bid is greater than $0.50. You would own the Alternative
(worth $0.60) and pay the price of $0.50 . . . for a total of $0.10. This amount
is less than the Status Quo ($0.25)!
How do you determine your bid? One way is to start with the minimum possible
price (say $0.01) and then ask yourself: “Do I want to buy at a price of $0.01?” (If
you do, your earnings would be $0.60 – $0.01 = $0.59 instead of $0.25 (Status Quo)).
Then, work your way up: “Do I want to buy at a price of $0.02?” (If you do, your
earnings would be $0.60 – $0.02 = $0.58 instead of $0.25). You will eventually reach
a price at which you are just as well off as with the Status Quo. Alternatively, you
can start with the maximum possible price (say $1.10) and then ask yourself: “Do I
want to buy at a price of $1.10?” (If you do, your earnings would be $0.60 – $1.10
= (-$0.50) instead of $0.25 (Status Quo)). Then, work your way down: “Do I want
to buy at a price of $1.09?” and so on. It is your best strategy to bid a price
at which you feel just as well off owning the Alternative (and paying this
price) as with owning the Status Quo.
Before we proceed, are there any questions?
Below is an example buying task. To make sure you understand how earnings are
determined, we ask you, hypothetically, to make a bid as if this were a paid decision
task. Based on this bid we then ask you to answer questions related to what you
would have earned from this task. We will pay you $2 if you answer all earnings
questions correctly, and add this to your earnings in today’s experiment.
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Based on the Status Quo and Alternative above, please place a bid:
Q1. Suppose the random price is $1. You would (circle one): not buy buy
Your earnings from this task would then be:
Q2. Suppose the random price is $0.25. You would (circle one): not buy buy
Your earnings from this task would then be:
Q3. At what price would you be just as well off as with the Status Quo?
Please raise your hand when you are ready, so that we can check your calculations.
Ready to Go
You will now go through 1 practice buying task and 6 paid buying tasks. The practice
task will be first and will not affect your earnings. You will be paid based on your
decision in each of the 6 paid buying tasks that follow.
In each task, you can submit a bid between $0.00 and $1.10 (inclusive) using one-cent
increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit a bid, the computer will randomly determine the price by selecting
a number between $0.01 and $1.10 (inclusive). Each number in this range has an
equal chance of being selected.
Before we proceed, are there any questions?
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C.1.1.2 Private Good High Stakes Rounds
Part 2: Individual Buying Task (High Stakes)
What the Status Quo and Alternative are worth is now uncertain.
The Status Quo or the Alternative, or both, may now be worth an uncertain amount
of money. In this event, you will see two possible amounts, each with a 50% chance
of occurring. In the example below, you have a Status Quo where you receive $2 or
$6, each with a 50% chance of occurring.
With an uncertain payout, to determine your earnings the computer will virtually
“flip a coin” by generating a random number to determine which of the two amounts
you will receive. For example, if you kept the Status Quo in the above example, if
the virtual “flip” comes up Heads you would receive $2 and if it comes up Tails you
would receive $6. Hence, each amount is equally likely.
The procedure that determines whether you buy is the same as before.
After you submit your bid, your bid will be compared to a randomly determined
price. Since the price is random, it is neither based on your bid nor is it related to
the bids of any other person in the room. Here is how this random price will be used
to determine whether you buy:
If your bid is greater than or the same as the random price, then you buy
the Alternative and give up the Status Quo. Your earnings from this task will equal
the amount that your Alternative is worth, minus the random price.
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If your bid is less than the random price then you do not buy the Alterna-
tive. Thus, you simply keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from this task will equal
the amount that your Status Quo is worth.
In each task, you can submit a bid between $0.00 and $12.00 (inclusive) using one-
cent increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit a bid, the computer will randomly determine the price by selecting
a number between $0.01 and $12.00 (inclusive). Each number in this range will have
an equal chance of being selected.
At the end of today’s session, to determine your earnings from this Part of the ex-
periment, the computer will randomly select at least one of the tasks from Part 2
to be paid out.
You will not know the number of tasks in Part 2 until it is finished. The first task
will be for practice and will not impact your earnings.
The remaining tasks can all affect your earnings. Since you will not know what tasks
are played out to determine your earnings, you will not see any results after submit-
ting an offer for a task. You will simply proceed to the next task. Treat each task
as if it determines your earnings.
Before we proceed are there any questions?
C.1.1.3 Public Good High Stakes Rounds
Part 3: Buying Task (High Stakes)
Your decisions will now affect the earnings of others.
In each task you will now be randomly and anonymously matched with one other
person in the room. You will be re-matched with a different person prior to each
task.
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You will see the Status Quo and Alternative for yourself and the other person, as
illustrated below. The amounts for the other person may be different from your own,
so please look at this information carefully. Importantly, for these tasks your bid
determines whether or not you and the other person buy the Alternative
and give up the Status Quo. The person you are matched with will not have an
opportunity to affect the outcome.
Similar to before, after you submit your bid, it will be compared to a randomly
determined price. Since the price is random, it is neither based on your bid nor is
it related to the bids of any other person in the room.
If your bid is greater than or the same as the random price, then both
you and the other person buy the Alternative and give up Status Quo.
Your earnings from this task will equal the amount that your Alternative is worth,
minus the random price. The earnings for the other person will equal the amount
that their Alternative is worth, minus the random price. You and the other person
will each pay the random price (not your bid!).
If your bid is less than the random price, then both you and the other person
keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from this task will equal the amount that your
Status Quo is worth. The earnings for the other person will equal the amount that
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their Status Quo is worth.
In each task, you can submit a bid between $0.00 and $12.00 (inclusive) using one-
cent increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit a bid, the computer will randomly determine the price by selecting
a number between $0.01 and $12.00 (inclusive). Each number in this range will have
an equal chance of being selected.
Know that at the same time you are making a decision that affects the earnings of
you and another person in the room, the person you are matched with is also making
a decision that can affect your earnings.
At the end of today’s session, to determine your earnings from this Part of the ex-
periment, the computer will randomly select at least two of the tasks from Part 3
to be paid out. For at least one of these paid tasks, your decision will determine
the earnings for you and the person you are matched with. For at least one of the
paid tasks, the decision of the person you are matched with will determine the
earnings for you and that person.
You will not know the number of tasks in Part 3 until it is finished. The first task
will be for practice and will not impact your earnings.
The remaining tasks can all affect your earnings. Since you will not know what tasks
are played out to determine your earnings, you will not see any results after submit-
ting an offer for a task. You will simply proceed to the next task. Treat each task
as if it determines your earnings.
Before we proceed are there any questions?
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C.1.2 WTA Treatment
The instructions below correspond with the (1) Training Tasks, (2) Public Good High
Stakes Tasks, (3) Private Good High Stakes Tasks treatment order.
C.1.2.1 Low Stakes Rounds
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. Please
follow the instructions carefully, as the amount of money you earn in the experiment
will depend on your decisions. At the end of today’s session, you will be paid your
earnings in private and in cash. Please do not communicate with other participants
during the experiment unless instructed. Importantly, please refrain from verbally
reacting to events that occur during the experiment.
Overview
Today’s experiment will involve several selling tasks. Each task may impact your
earnings, which means that it is very important to consider each task carefully prior
to making a decision. Each task is independent from the other tasks, so the decision
you make in one task will not affect the outcome or earnings of any other task. All
money amounts are in U.S. Dollars.
There are three parts to the experiment. The first part involves low stakes selling
tasks. The second and third parts involve high stakes selling tasks. You will receive
additional instructions at the end of the first part.
Part 1: Individual Buying Task (Low Stakes)
The selling task works as follows. You begin by owning the Status Quo, which is a
“good” worth an amount of money to you. (In the example below, the Status Quo
is $0.60.) The experimenter wishes to buy your Status Quo and instead give you an
Alternative. The Alternative is a different “good” worth an amount of money. (In the
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example below, the Alternative is $0.25.)
Your task is to submit an offer to sell the Status Quo to the experimenter.
If your offer is accepted, you will own the Alternative instead of the Status Quo.
You will receive money from the experimenter for selling the Alternative. Your earn-
ings from this task will be equal to the Alternative plus the selling price: Earnings
= Alternative + Selling Price.
If your offer is not accepted, you will keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from
this task will be equal to the Status Quo: Earnings = Status Quo.
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum compensation you
are willing to accept to own the Alternative instead of the Status Quo and offer this
amount. This minimum amount is the price at which you feel just as well off owning
the Alternative (and receiving this price) as with owning the Status Quo.
After you submit your offer, it will be compared to a randomly determined price.
Since the price is random, it is neither based on your bid nor is it related to the bids
of any other person in the room.
Here is how this random price will be used to determine whether you buy:
If your offer is less than or the same as the random price, then you sell the
Status Quo and instead own the Alternative. But here is the interesting part:
the selling price is the random price, not your offer. What this means is
that as long as you offer the minimum compensation required to own the Alternative
instead of the Status Quo, you will only sell at prices that are favorable to you and
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not sell at prices unfavorable to you.
If your offer is more than the random price then you do not sell the Status
Quo. Thus, you simply keep the Status Quo. Since you did not sell, you do not
receive the random price.
As you can see from the example, the Alternative is worth less money to you than the
Status Quo and so you may be asking yourself: “Why would I want to own the
Alternative and sell the Status Quo?” By selling, as long as it is at a favorable
price to you, you can earn more money than by simply keeping the Status Quo.
Using the example from before, let us see how:
• Suppose the random price is $0.75, and your offer is less than $0.75. You would
own the Alternative (worth $0.25) and get paid the random price of $0.75. Your
earnings would be $1, which is more than simply keeping the Status Quo ($0.60).
• Of course, you will not want to sell at just any price. Suppose the random price
is $0.10 and your offer is less than $0.10. You would own the Alternative (worth
$0.25) and receive the random price of $0.10. . . for a total of $0.35. This amount
is less than the Status Quo ($0.60)!
How do you determine your offer? One way is to start with the minimum possible
price (say $0.00) and then ask yourself: “Do I want to sell at a price of $0.00?” (If
you do, your earnings would be $0.25 + $0.00 = $0.25 instead of $0.60 (Status Quo)).
Then, work your way up: “Do I want to sell at a price of $0.01?” (If you do, your
earnings would be $0.25 + $0.01 = $0.26 instead of $0.60). You will eventually reach
a price at which you are just as well off as with the Status Quo. Alternatively, you
can start with the maximum possible price (say it is $1.09) and then ask yourself “Do
I want to sell at a price of $1.09?” (If you do your earnings would be $0.25 + $1.09
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= $1.34 instead of $0.60 (Status Quo)). Then work your way down: “Do I want to
sell at a price of $1.08?” and so on. It is your best strategy to offer a price at
which you feel just as well off owning the Alternative (and receiving this
price) as with owning the Status Quo.
Before we proceed, are there any questions?
Below is an example selling task. To make sure you understand how earnings are
determined, we next ask you, hypothetically, to make an offer as if this were a paid
decision task. Based on this offer we then ask you to answer questions related to what
you would have earned from this task. We will pay you $2 if you answer all earnings
questions correctly, and add this to your earnings in today’s experiment.
Based on the Status Quo and Alternative above, please make an offer:
Q1. Suppose the random price is $1. You would (circle one): not sell sell
Your earnings from this task would then be:
Q2. Suppose the random price is $0.25. You would (circle one): not sell sell
Your earnings from this task would then be:
Q3. At what price would you be just as well off as with the Status Quo?
Please raise your hand when you are ready, so that we can check your calculations.
Ready to Go
You will now go through 1 practice selling task and 6 paid selling tasks. The practice
task will be first and will not affect your earnings in any way. You will be paid based
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on your decision in each of the 6 paid selling tasks that follow.
In each task, you can submit an offer between $0.00 and $1.10 (inclusive) using one-
cent increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit an offer, the computer will randomly determine the price by selecting
a number between $0.00 and $1.09 (inclusive). Each number in this range has an equal
chance of being selected.
Before we proceed, are there any questions?
C.1.2.2 Group High Stakes Rounds
Part 2: Selling Task (High Stakes)
Your decisions will now affect the earnings of others.
The Status Quo or the Alternative, or both, may now be worth an uncertain amount
of money. In this event, you will be shown two possible amounts, each with a 50%
chance of occurring. In the example below, you have a Status Quo where you receive
$5 or $9, each with a 50% chance of occurring.
With an uncertain payout, to determine your earnings the computer will virtually
“flip a coin” by generating a random number to determine which of the two amounts
you will receive. For example, if you kept the Status Quo in the above example, if
the virtual “flip” comes up Heads you would receive $5 and if it comes up Tails you
would receive $9. Hence each amount is equally likely.
Your decisions will now affect the earnings of others.
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In each task you will now be randomly and anonymously matched with one other
person in the room. You will be re-matched with a different person prior to each
task.
You will see the Status Quo and Alternative for yourself and the other person, as
illustrated below. The amounts for the other person may be different from your own,
so please look at this information carefully. Importantly, for these tasks your offer
determines whether or not you and the other person will sell the Status Quo
and instead receive the Alternative. The person you are matched with will not have
an opportunity to affect the outcome.
Similar to before, after you submit your offer, it will be compared to a randomly
determined price. Since the price is random, it is neither based on your offer nor
is it related to the offers of any other person in the room.
If your offer is less than or the same as the random price, then both you
and the other person sell the Status Quo and instead own the Alternative.
Your earnings from this task will equal the amount that your Alternative is worth,
plus the random price. The earnings for the other person will equal the amount that
their Alternative is worth, plus the random price. You and the other person will each
receive the random price (not your offer!).
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If your offer is greater than the random price, then both you and the other
person keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from this task will equal the amount that
your Status Quo is worth. The earnings for the person will equal the amount that
their Status Quo is worth.
In each task, you can submit an offer between $0.00 and $12.00 (inclusive) using one-
cent increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit an offer, the computer will randomly determine the price by select-
ing a number between $0.00 and $11.99 (inclusive). Each number in this range will
have an equal chance of being selected.
Know that at the same time you are making a decision that affects the earnings of
you and another person in the room, the person you are matched with is also making
a decision that can affect your earnings.
At the end of today’s session, to determine your earnings from this Part of the ex-
periment, the computer will randomly select at least two of the tasks from Part 2
to be paid out. For at least one of these paid tasks, your decision will determine
the earnings for you and the person you are matched with. For at least one of the
paid tasks, the decision of the person you are matched with will determine the
earnings for you and that person.
You will not know the number of tasks in Part 2 until it is finished. The first task
will be for practice and will not impact your earnings.
The remaining tasks can all affect your earnings. Since you will not know what tasks
are played out to determine your earnings, you will not see any results after submit-
ting an offer for a task. You will simply proceed to the next task. Treat each task
as if it determines your earnings.
Before we proceed are there any questions?
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C.1.2.3 Individual High Stakes Rounds
Part 3: Individual Selling Task (High Stakes)
Your decisions will no longer affect the earnings of others.
Unlike in the last part, you will not be randomly matched with another person in
the room.
You will only see your Status Quo and your Alternative. Your decisions will only
affect your earnings and not the earnings of another person.
The main rules are the same as before. We will go through these again.
After you submit your offer, your offer will be compared to a randomly determined
price. Since the price is random, it is neither based on your offer nor is it related
to the offers of any other person in the room. Here is how this random price will be
used to determine whether you sell:
If your offer is less than or the same as the random price, then you sell
the Status Quo and instead own the Alternative. Your earnings from this task will
then be equal to the amount that your Alternative is worth, plus the random price.
If your offer is greater than the random price then you do not sell the
Status Quo. Thus, you simply keep the Status Quo. Your earnings from this task
will equal the amount that your Status Quo is worth.
In each task, you can submit an offer between $0.00 and $12.00 (inclusive) using one-
cent increments. Use a decimal point (“.”) to separate dollars and cents.
After you submit a bid, the computer will randomly determine the price by selecting
a number between $0.00 and $11.99 (inclusive). Each number in this range will have
an equal chance of being selected.
At the end of today’s session, to determine your earnings from this Part of the ex-
periment, the computer will randomly select at least one of the tasks from Part 3
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to be paid out.
You will not know the number of tasks in Part 3 until it is finished. The first task
will be for practice and will not impact your earnings.
The remaining tasks can all affect your earnings. Since you will not know what tasks
are played out to determine your earnings, you will not see any results after submit-
ting an offer for a task. You will simply proceed to the next task. Treat each task
as if it determines your earnings.




Figure C.1: Decision Screen, Training Buying Task
Figure C.2: Decision Screen, Private Good High Stakes Buying Task
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Figure C.3: Decision Screen, Public Good High Stakes Buying Task
Figure C.4: Earnings Screen, Low Stakes Buying Task
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Figure C.5: Earnings Screen, Private Good High Stakes Buying Task
Figure C.6: Earnings Screen, Public Good High Stakes Buying Task
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C.2.2 WTA Treatment
Figure C.7: Decision Screen, Low Stakes Selling Task
Figure C.8: Decision Screen, Private Good High Stakes Selling Task
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Figure C.9: Decision Screen, Public Good High Stakes Selling Task
Figure C.10: Earnings Screen, Low Stakes Selling Task
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Figure C.11: Earnings Screen, Private Good High Stakes Selling Task
Figure C.12: Earnings Screen, Public Good High Stakes Selling Task
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C.3 Regression Estimates
Table C.1: Public Good Regression Estimates, Full Sample





Intercept 1.49*** (0.24) 0.32* (0.18) 1.17*** (0.29)
∆σ⊕ -0.02 (0.13) -0.21** (0.08) 0.19 (0.15)












c Intercept 1.69*** (0.28) 0.50** (0.20) 1.19*** (0.35)
∆σ⊕ -0.06 (0.11) -0.33*** (0.09) 0.27* (0.14)














Intercept 2.52*** (0.31) 0.80*** (0.26) 1.73*** (0.40)
∆σ⊕ -0.38*** (0.10) -0.13* (0.08) -0.25* (0.13)
∆σ	 0.51*** (0.07) 0.23*** (0.07) 0.29*** (0.10)
δµ⊕ -0.39*** (0.05) -0.38*** (0.04) -0.01 (0.06)
δµ	 0.24*** (0.05) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.08 (0.06)
δσ⊕ 0.30*** (0.09) 0.06 (0.07) 0.24** (0.11)
δσ	 0.06 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) -0.02 (0.08)
N = 5, 208, R2 = 0.38, F = 33.92***
Note: Coefficients estimates based on pooled model. WTA and WTP specific parameters are shown
across columns for comparison. All coefficient estimates are in dollars. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the subject level (168 subjects), are in parantheses. Significance of statistic at the 1%,
5%, and 10% is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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